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ABSTRACT 
After eight years of conventional U.S. Army involvement in Afghanistan, the 
Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) have remained organized and trained to 
defeat a peer or near-peer enemy in a direct, symmetrical conflict.  The complex 
socio-ethnical structure of Afghanistan requires something new, but an analysis 
of international forces involved in a century of Counterinsurgency Operations 
(COIN) operations indicates a variety of metrics of successful organization and 
training.  Something new can be found in something old.  Through the analysis of 
historical COIN conflicts and combatants in Algeria, Philippines, Vietnam, and 
Afghanistan, the modern military analyst can determine effective metrics for the 
assessment, selection, organization and training of contemporary COIN forces. 
Counterinsurgency Operations are not merely a less-intense form of conflict 
within the Range of Military Operations, but an entirely different arc of the warfare 
continuum and require specialized units, operations, tactics and skills that are 
beyond capabilities of an organic IBCT.  In the current fight, IBCTs receive a 
number of these enablers upon arrival into theater, and enjoy a margin of 
success during their tour.  This thesis finds a correlation between training and 
organizing COIN-specific forces prior to their engagement in the conflict, and the 
eventual success or failure of that force in a COIN struggle.  Though success in 
COIN comes with higher risk and is more manpower intensive, the lower 
technological and logistical demands warrant additional research from a force 
design perspective.  Based on the preponderance of low-intensity conflicts over 
the incidents of high-intensity conflict during the post-WWII era, America may be 
wise in establishing designated “COIN” battalions and brigades within the 
standing force package 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 In small wars, the goal is to gain decisive results with the 
least application of force and the consequent minimum loss of life.  
The end aim is the social, economic, and political development of 
the people subsequent to the military defeat of the enemy 
insurgent.  In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness 
should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of the 
population.1 
USMC LTG Lewis Walt 
A. PURPOSE 
 After nine years of conventional United States Army involvement in the 
conflict in Afghanistan, the combat Brigades and Battalions of the Light, Airborne, 
and Air Assault Divisions remain organized to defeat a peer or near-peer enemy 
in a direct, symmetrical conflict.  Army Transformation in 2003–2004 dissolved 
the primacy of the Division as the metric of Army deployable power, and 
reorganized the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) with the ability to be more 
autonomous on the battlespace.  The autonomy is derived from an increase in 
the density of combat support and combat service and support that are now 
organic to the BCT, versus the traditionally homogenous Infantry formations that 
required outside augmentation from the Division.  John Nagl and Edward Luttwak 
assert that that Counterinsurgency Operations are not just a “lesser-included 
offense” of the traditional Range of Military Operations (ROMO), but an entirely 
different arc of conflict that requires specialized units, operations, tactics and 
skills that are counter to the current capabilities even of a Transformed BCT.2   
 Given the blood and treasure involved, the researcher asks is there a 
better way to organize the present force to fit the counterinsurgency operation in 
                                            
1 Andrew F Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986), 172. 
2 Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Conflict” in Dimensions of Military Strategy, 
edited by George Edward Thibault. (Washington: National Defense University. Press, 1987), 335. 
John Nagl,  Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), xv.  John Nagl, “Let’s Win the Wars We’re 
In,” Joint Forces Quarterly 52, 1st Quarter (2009), 20–26, http://www.au.af.mil/ au/awc/ awcgate/ 
jfq/ nagl_win_wars.pdf (accessed 13 October 2010), 22. 
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Afghanistan?  Before undergoing another massive reorganization, what historical 
evidence exists that would validate dedicating a portion of America’s 
expeditionary forces to a more permanent counterinsurgent organization, 
geographically oriented, and with an optimized Modified Table of Organization 
and Equipment (MTOE), and specialized training regimens? 
 Afghanistan is not the first counterinsurgent operation that the United 
States and her allies have dealt with; in terms of armed conflict, the 20th century 
was dominated by guerrilla wars, low-intensity conflict, contingency operations, 
and “emergencies,” many times more than conventional peer-on-peer state 
interstate violence.  As the great colonial empires dissolved their global influence 
following World War II, and the ideologies of Communism and Islamism 
expanded, the western democratic regimes increasingly found themselves in 
expansive conflicts against often-invisible enemies.  These enemies could 
conceal themselves in a disaffected native population, and the subsequent 
weakness of post-colonial governance often required outside assistance from the 
former colonial powers.  In order to maintain former client states tenuous grips 
upon state power, the ex-colonial powers interceded with dedicated combat 
troops, or select groups of advisors.  Post-colonial and superpower militaries 
were often initially outclassed through misapplication of the elements of national 
power, and operational planning and task organization that was based upon 
seeking a peer-to-near-pear direct confrontation.3   
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
 With a few situational variances, historic expeditionary military elements 
that prepared and organized for a counterinsurgent fight, prior to committing to 
the fight, enjoyed more relative success than traditionally employed, but 
technologically more advanced forces.  Related to this concept is the question 
posed by Edward Luttwak but seconded by this researcher.  Given the 
preponderance of low-intensity, COIN-centric conflicts on an international scale, 
                                            
3 Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Conflict,” 340–41. 
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and the likelihood of the next conflict being of a low intensity, COIN-centric 
nature, is there a benefit to the United States maintaining regionally oriented, 
quasi-conventional COIN forces?4  Is there a historical precedent of a nation 
state succeeding in COIN with a pre-organized and established COIN force, or 
have the successful COIN forces evolved over the duration of a struggle?   
C. METHODOLOGY 
1. Variables and Metrics 
 In this study, I plan to demonstrate a historical validity that there is a 
correlation between the level of pre-deployment training and organization of a 
given COIN force, and the resultant level of success that force gains over an 
opponent.  I will accomplish this through a comparative case study approach, in 
keeping with the George and Bennett models of case study construction.5  My 
hypothesis is that conventional combat battalions and brigades that deploy to a 
COIN environment after training with their full complement of combat power and 
enablers are more effective in the COIN environment than units that are 
organized of non-organic elements from within an area of operations. 
 The independent variable for this experiment is the level of training and 
organization of historic conventional COIN forces.  Rather than a mere “yes” or 
“no” answer, I will quantify and describe relevant training received, and how the 
specifics may have tied into success or failure.  As the research has 
demonstrated, a preponderance of COIN forces adapt and evolve from their 
traditional skill sets while engaged in their conflicts.  This is commonly conducted  
through leader education and training centers established within the conflict 
zone.  I will describe the “in-theater” training of some of the more evolutionary 
forces, where this is an indicator of success. 
                                            
4 Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Conflict,” 341. 
5 Alexander L George, and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 151–164. 
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 The dependent variable is the success or failure of a COIN force; despite 
the best efforts of dozens of military and social science experts, normalizing 
specific metrics is a daunting task, especially when considering the breadth of 
the campaigns in this study.  From the RAND study, “Victory has A Thousand 
Fathers”, I will derive metrics to determine the relative levels of success or failure 
of the various forces used for COIN.  The same RAND study also include metrics 
to determine the success or failure of the whole of the governments involved in a 
counterinsurgent campaign. 
 The basis of the RAND study is a data set of thirty counterinsurgent fights 
that have taken place in the international scene, from 1978 to 2006.  Their data is 
inclusive, as every conflict that started and stopped within those two dates is 
included in the study; there is no statistical normalization done to the data.6  In 
the RAND analysis, the authors determined 15 “good” COIN practices, and 12 
“bad” COIN practices.  These metrics are not perfectly opposed to one another, 
e.g., if the COIN force has 51% of the tangible support of an insurgency, the 
insurgency has the remaining 49%; some are “good” practices can counteract 
some “bad” practices.  The RAND metrics are qualitative in nature, and lend 
themselves to analysis of a government and COIN force over the course of a 
long insurgency.  While not in themselves an operational checklist, the “Good” 
and “Bad” practices seem worthwhile to periodically review as a COIN force 
progresses through a campaign, a useful mirror on one’s own operations.  These 
metrics, displayed in Table 1, serve as independent variables to the dependant 
variable in this study, which is victory or defeat of a COIN force in a COIN 
struggle (Figure 1).   
                                            
6 Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, “Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: 
Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG964.html (accessed 10 October 2010), 8–9. 
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Table 1.   “Good” and “Bad” Practices in COIN7 
 The RAND researchers found, through analysis of the forces involved in 
these recent cases, a set of six key findings that correlate to successful COIN 
campaigns.  They are: 
1. Effective COIN practices tend to run in packs  
2. The balance of “good” versus “bad” practices perfectly predicts 
outcomes  
3. Tangible support trumps popular support.  
4. Of 20 COIN approaches tested, 13 received strong [evidentiary] 
support, while three are not supported by evidence8 
                                            
7 Christopher Paul, et al., “Victory Has a Thousand Fathers,” xviii. 
15 “Good” COIN Practices 12 “Bad” COIN Practices 
• The COIN force adhered to several strategic 
communication principles. 
• The COIN force significantly reduced tangible 
insurgent support. 
• The government established or maintained 
legitimacy in the area of conflict. 
• The government was at least a partial democracy. 
• COIN force intelligence was adequate to support 
effective engagement or disruption of insurgents. 
• The COIN force was of sufficient strength to force 
the insurgents to fight as guerrillas. 
• The government/state was competent.  
• The COIN force avoided excessive collateral 
damage, disproportionate use of force, or other 
illegitimate applications of force. 
• The COIN force sought to engage and establish 
positive relations with the population in the area of 
conflict. 
• Short-term investments, improvements in 
infrastructure or development, or property reform 
occurred in the area of conflict controlled or claimed 
by the COIN force. 
• The majority of the population in the area of conflict 
supported or favored the COIN force. 
• The COIN force established and then expanded 
secure areas. 
• The COIN force had and used uncontested air 
dominance. 
• The COIN force provided or ensured the provision of 
basic services in areas that it controlled or claimed 
to control. 
• The perception of security was created or 
maintained among the population in areas that the 
COIN force claimed to control. 
• The COIN force used both collective 
punishment and escalating repression. 
• The primary COIN force was an external 
occupier. 
• COIN force or government actions 
contributed to substantial new grievances 
claimed by the insurgents. 
• Militias worked at cross-purposes with the 
COIN force or government. 
• The COIN force resettled or removed 
civilian populations for population control. 
• COIN force collateral damage was 
perceived by the population in the area of 
conflict as worse than the insurgents’. 
• In the area of conflict, the COIN force was 
perceived as worse than the insurgents. 
• The COIN force failed to adapt to changes 
in adversary strategy, operations, or tactics. 
• The COIN force engaged in more coercion 
or intimidation than the insurgents. 
• The insurgent force was individually 
superior to the COIN force by being either 
more professional or better motivated. 
• The COIN force or its allies relied on looting 
for sustainment. 
• The COIN force and government had 




5. Repression wins phases, but usually not cases 
6. Poor beginnings do not necessarily lead to poor ends9 
 
 These findings are relative to the final tally of victory or defeat in a COIN 
struggle.  For purposes of my analysis of the historic case studies, I will focus on 
the top three indicators in the above list.   
 As noted in the RAND study, for the COIN force, eight of the analyzed 
struggles are listed as “win,” while 22 are listed as “loss,” though the definitions of 
“win” and “loss” bear elucidation in Figure 1.10  I will use this model to determine 
COIN force “win or loss” relative to the selected case studies.   
 
     
Figure 1.   COIN Metric of “Win” or “Loss”11 
                                            
8 Christopher Paul, et. al., “Victory Has a Thousand Fathers,” xx.  Table S.3 displays 20 
distinct approaches to COIN, as identified in COIN literature by the RAND researchers.  
Significant to forces that succeeded in COIN are Operational approaches described as 
“Pacification,” “Democracy,” “Tangible Support Reduction,” and “Flexibility and Adaptability.”  
Significant to forces that failed at COIN (22 of the 30 case studies) were approaches such as 
“’Crush them,’” “Resettlement,” and “Insurgent Support Strategies.”  Chapter 3 of the RAND study 
defines and operationalizes each of the 20 approaches, in detail.  For simplicity, I will maintain an 
operational perspective of my sample of COIN forces in order to assess their effectiveness (Table 
1), and will leave the strategic assessment for further research. 
9 Christopher Paul, et al., “Victory Has a Thousand Fathers,” xv–xxiii.  Authors define 
tangible support as “the ability of the insurgents to replenish and obtain personnel, material, 
financing, intelligence, and sanctuary.”  Authors define popular support as “the majority of the 
population in the area of conflict wanted the COIN force to win” (operationalization of popular 
support). 
10 Christopher Paul, et al., “Victory Has a Thousand Fathers,” xvii. 
11 Christopher Paul, et al., “Victory Has a Thousand Fathers,” 9, Figure 2.2. 
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 Managing the control variables in order to conduct a case-by-case 
comparison is a monumental task, given the cross-section of disparate case 
studies selected.  COIN struggles can be an undercurrent to a high intensity 
model of conflict, highlighted by the differences between the village war fought by 
USMC Combined Action Program (CAP) platoons, versus the 1–7 Cavalry 
experience in the A Shau Valley in 1965.12  Insurgencies can be socio-economic 
motivated, but religiously fueled, as evidenced in Algeria,13 or in Afghanistan 
against the Soviet Union.14  A final archetype within the selection of insurgent 
case studies would be anti-colonial and tied to post-WWII communist expansion, 
as evidenced in the Philippines.  Interspersed within the Vietnam, Philippines, 
and in some parts of the Afghanistan case studies are strong ethnic and/or tribal 
overtones that were driving factors in each of those insurgencies.  In the analysis 
chapter, I will highlight where confounding factors within the controls may have 
affected the outcome, as I will also highlight key operational and strategic 
decisions that could have affected the overall outcome of the conflict.  
 The researcher must take a level of liberty with these qualitative 
assessments, as variations can exist even within the same conflict and Area of 
Operations (AO).  For example, the isolated areas in which the CIA/SF Civilian 
Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) operated demonstrated marked reductions in 
SVN village chieftain intimidation/murder, school teacher murder, and income 
taxes/land taxes paid into the central government of SVN.  These positive trends 
ceased when MAC-V reallocated the forces to more of a direct action/counter 
terrorism mission.15  While the entirety of the COIN (pacification) campaign in 
Vietnam was a failure, the isolated groups of U.S.M.C. CAPs in the I Corps 
sector of South Vietnam were highly successful.  Though highly trained as 
                                            
12 John Nagl,  Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, xiv-xv; Dave R. Palmer, Summons of the 
Trumpet: U.S. – Vietnam in Perspective  (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1977), 98–103. 
13 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, revised edition (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1987), 97. 
14 David Loyn, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian, and American 
Occupation (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 138. 
15 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam, 70–71. 
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traditional ROMO fighters, the British used Light Infantry in Malaya in massive 
cordon and search operations, only later to decentralize and evolve to a more 
village centric force, focused on the populace.16 
2. The Case Studies 
There are hundreds of case studies on counterinsurgency, guerrilla wars, 
insurrections, and low-intensity conflict.  This study will focus on conflicts in the 
third world of Asia and Africa in which post-colonial Europe or America engaged 
with expeditionary combat troops, advisors, or combinations of both.  I selected 
the following case studies because they all involve a superpower employing an 
expeditionary force to an allied or client state, and conducting counterinsurgent 
operations.  Each conflict lasted for a significant duration, long enough for 
theater-level modifications to the existing force and doctrine to manifest within 
the affected COIN force, and possibly within the institution itself.  I have gathered 
my data through an analysis of the forces used, domestic or foreign, in the 
counterinsurgent struggles in Vietnam (1960-1973), Algeria (1954-1962), and 
Afghanistan (1979-1988), and the relative success or failures that these forces 
enjoyed.  Primary antagonists have at their base Communist, Islamist, 
Nationalist, or Ethnic motivations, or combinations thereof.  Algeria in 1954 was 
essentially a Nationalist conflict, but drew populist support through Islamist and 
ethnic rhetoric.17  Vietnam in the post-Dien Bien Phu 1960s was a classic Maoist 
peoples’ revolution, but nationalistic fervor enabled the NVA and VC to sustain 
horrendous losses, yet sustain the fight indefinitely.18  The Afghan conflict of 
1979-1989, provides a second, comparative view of a global superpower versus 
an insurgency, and the differing practices of pacification relative to the American 
experience in Vietnam.  From the Soviet and American case studies, we can 
demonstrate the negative COIN effects of inflexibility within a conventional force, 
                                            
16 John Nagl,  Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 67–69. 
17 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, 99–101. 
18 Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams, 363-365 
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with a resultant minimal evolution of that force.  Not analyzed in the case studies, 
but noteworthy in Chapter V, is the low-intensity conflict involving the Philippines 
and the Hukbalahap Rebellion of the early 1950s.  This was a proto-western 
democracy standing in opposition to a Maoist communist insurgency, and 
represents a level of success on two levels.  The Philippine government 
successful integrated all aspects of national power to defeat the root causes of 
the insurgency, and they were willing to dramatically reorganize and prepare their 
armed forces prior to engaging in the contested areas.19   
 Table 2 describes the results of this study, elucidating only a partial 
confirmation of the hypothesis.  The most successful COIN forces evolved in the 
theater of conflict, during the mid-to-late stages of the conflict.   
Table 2.   Comparative Results of Historic COIN Forces 
 No forces were committed to the initial fight task organized or trained 
specifically for COIN.  The most poignant example of a successful unit in a failed 
mission is the U.S.M.C. Combined Action Platoons of the I Corps AOR; insofar 
as a cost-benefit analysis is concerned, 15 U.S. Marines pacified an urbanized 
area of five square miles,20 and defeated two 100-140-man VC and NVA 
                                            
19 Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency 
Doctrine and the Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 52–54. 
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deliberate attacks on their stronghold.21  Through the entirety of the I Corps 
AOR, 114 CAP elements secured nearly 400,000 civilians throughout the 
duration of the program; an effective economy of force operation with decisive 
operational effects.22  
 The closest example to a purely selected, designed and trained COIN 
force set would be the Battalion Combat Teams (BCT) of the Philippine Army; 
while this force was strategic in scope, its development was also evolutionary, 
and the overarching success of the COIN force was tightly woven into the proper 
utilization of the other elements of state power.  I excluded this case from the 
study as it did not involve the expeditionary forces of an external nation-state to 
the state in conflict, but the force training and development are worthy of note. 
3. Literature Review 
 The literature available on COIN related topics is extensive.  This 
summery of the source work for this study includes contemporary theory, 
historical reviews, historic analysis of the conflicts of the case studies, and the 
general study of low-intensity conflict.   
 To provide baseline knowledge of counterinsurgent operations and 
contemporary doctrine, I refer to FM 3-24: The Counterinsurgent Field Manual 
(2006), jointly composed by David Petraeus and James Amos.  David Kilcullen, 
in both The Accidental Guerrilla (2009) and Counterinsurgency (2010), provides 
modern views of classical problems, and goes far toward operationalizing some 
of the more mundane aspects of a COIN campaign.  Max Boot in The Savage  
 
 
Wars Of Peace (2002) gives excellent historical analysis of American force 
involvement in low-intensity conflicts, in particular the U.S.M.C. Combined Action 
Program in Vietnam. 
                                            
21 Peter Brush, “Civic Action: The Marine Corps Experience in Vietnam, Part I,” Small Wars 
Journal, http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/brush.htm (Accessed 10 November 2010), 4. 
22 Peter Brush, “Civic Action: The Marine Corps Experience in Vietnam, Part I,” 2. 
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 John Nagl and Gian P. Gentile offer excellent opposing assessments on 
the modern force structure relative to a COIN environment; the articles “Let’s Win 
the Wars We’re In” and “Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars” are found in Joint 
Forces Quarterly (2009).  Nagl remains a proponent of an adaptive evolutionary 
armed force for America, and calls for the institutionalization of the lessons 
learned in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.  Gentile adopts the 
counter-argument wherein America should finish the contemporary 
counterinsurgent wars, and resume the business of training, equipping and 
manning the force for high intensity conflict.  National Defense Research 
Institute, an element within RAND, discusses methods to transfer the reality of 
the ad hoc force structure and skill sets of the battlefield into the institution in 
Preparing for the Proven Inevitable: An Urban Operations Training Strategy for 
America’s Joint Force (2006).  Edward Luttwak in his article “Notes on Low 
Intensity Conflict” (1987) discusses various historical COIN fights and salient 
principals behind them, but also offers views about the use of conventional forces 
in COIN fights.  
 Literature available on the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines is widely 
available.  To maintain a focus on the training, development, and selection of 
forces utilized to conduct COIN, Edward Lansdale’s account, In the Midst of 
Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia (1972) is a primary source.  Both 
Larry Cable in Conflict of Myths (1986) and Robert Taber in The War of the Flea 
(2002) serve as excellent sources for an operational and tactical assessment of 
the forces available, as well as overarching strategic analysis of the campaign. 
 Andrew Krepinevich’s work, The U.S. Army and Vietnam (1986), 
describes some of the failures of the high strategic decision makers in the 
Vietnam conflict, as well as an in-depth analysis of the situation the American 
forces were committed to.  Bernard Fall in The Two Vietnams (1967) also 
discusses French and American involvement in the region; his insights as to the 
indices of a spreading insurgency form crucial heuristic models to understanding 
the environment within which a COIN force operates.  Dave Palmer in A Bright 
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Shining Lie (1988), and Neil Sheehan in The Summons of the Trumpet (1978) 
provide literary insight into the operational and strategic nature of the Vietnam 
War; Sheehan in particular discusses the relevancy of the American populace, 
and internal politics, in the execution of a protracted war.  A key resource for the 
tactical assessment of the U.S.M.C. CAP platoons is the account of Bing West in 
his work, The Village, originally published in 1972. 
 There are two classical studies of the French counterinsurgency 
experience in Algeria.  Alistair Horne, in A Savage War of Peace (1979) delves 
into the roots of the insurgency, and the initial heavy-handed approach the 
French formations took to combating the Islamists; a comparative study that 
provides more detail to the preparation of subsequent formations exists in Alf 
Andrew Heggoy’s tome, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria (1972).  M. 
Alexander, M. Evens, and J. Keiger edited a collection of personal accounts of 
the Algerian Experience in The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954-62: 
Experiences, Images, Testimonies (2002), while Irwin Wall describes the limited 
American involvement in the conflict in France, the United States, and the 
Algerian War (2001).  
Two significant works regarding Afghanistan capture the basic concept of 
the history of the region; both Sir Martin Ewans’ Afghanistan (2002) and David 
Loyn’s In Afghanistan (2009) form a rough skeleton of the progression of the 
people and the state, the various mechanisms and forms of government 
attempted over the centuries, and provide significant insight into the nature of the 
Pashtun people.  Thomas Barfield in Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History 
(2010), neatly supplements these earlier perspectives, and adds contemporary 
analysis of the nature of the state.  Tailor and Botea (2008) also addressed this 
concept in their article contrasting Afghanistan and Vietnam state structures, set 
against the Charles Tilly thesis of state-building.  Lincoln Keiser develops the 
concept of Pashtunwali in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region with his book Friend 
by Day, Enemy by Night (2002); Les Grau (2010), and Robert Kaplan (2001) 
further analyze the tribal nature of the region, generational memories of honor 
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and conflict, and the predominance of the Pashtun tribes and culture, while 
Cynthia Mahmood (1996) provides insights into the neighboring Sikh and Punjabi 
militant cultures.  Various authors (Grau, 1998; Combs, 2006; Kaplan, 2005) 
provide insight as to both Soviet and American Coalition military and aid efforts 
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II. THE DILEMMA OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN COIN  
 To meet future challenges, America’s Army must turn from 
the warm and well-deserved glow of its Persian Gulf victory and 
embrace, once more the real business of regulars, the stinking gray 
shadow world of “savage wars of peace,” as Rudyard Kipling called 
them.23 
LTG Daniel P. Bolger 
A. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE 
Since early February 2002, conventional Army battalions have conducted 
operations in Afghanistan, steadily evolving from large-scale kinetic operations to 
low intensity, population-centric operations.24  Despite the success of these 
modified formations, and the anticipated long duration of the Global War on 
Terror, why are these traditional light infantry, airborne, and air assault BCTs still 
organized in the traditional, triangular force structure that doctrinally is best suited 
for operations against a peer enemy?  Paul Grant emphasizes the point that 
extensive training is essential to prepare conventional forces for success in a 
COIN environment, but COIN training is often overshadowed by training events 
intended to maintain proficiency in ROMO tasks.  I concur with his sentiment for 
the wars we are involved in currently, but further expand the question.  Could the 
frictions in contemporary training be averted by selecting certain light infantry 
units to completely realign their focus, and orient their efforts on maintaining a 
regionally oriented COIN-centric METL, as opposed to attempting to prioritize 
every operational possibility within the Range of Military Operations? 
                                            
23 Daniel P. Bolger, “The Ghosts of Omdurman,” Parameters (Autumn 1991), 28–39, 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/1991/1991%20bolger.pdf (Accessed 11 
November 2010).  LTG Bolger is presently the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army. 
24 Dennis Sullivan, Interview with LTC Dennis Sullivan, edited by Operational Leadership 
Experiences Project (FT Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 26 June 2006), 
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll13&CISOPTR=446&CIS
OBOX=1&REC=12 (accessed 3 November 2010), 7.  COL Sullivan served as the battalion 
executive officer of 1-87 IN, 1/10 BCT, in Regional Command-East, in Afghanistan from JUL 
2003-APR 2004. 
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 One of the milestones that a BCT must pass on the way to Afghanistan 
is the Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) at one of the Army’s Combat Training 
Centers.  Since 2004, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the National 
Training Center (NTC) and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) have 
updated their traditional ROMO-based training scenarios to reflect more of a 
counterinsurgent menu of training tasks for the various types of BCTs in the 
Army inventory.  Planners among the CTC’s, Forces Command (FORSCOM), 
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), and the effected Divisions and Brigades, 
routinely put forth superlative effort to ensure that as many of the normally 
deployed slice of enabling Soldiers (those with special skills not normally within 
an IBCT organization) are attending the MRE with the preparing BCT.  Based 
upon communication with the existing unit in theater, the templated replacement 
Battalion and Brigade will task organize to train at the CTC for two weeks in a 
simulated environment that attempts to mirror the theater to which they will 
deploy.25  Are these two weeks of training enough to hone Standard Operating 
Procedures and Contingency Operations with such a non-doctrinal task 
organization? 
From a macro view, the current method of BCT employment in the 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) environment involves 90-120-Soldier 
elements operating out of small, semi-self-contained Forward Operating Bases 
(FOB) dispersed about a battalion-sized Area of Operations (AO), which may 
encompass an entire province within Afghanistan.  These Soldiers may operate 
with elements of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and may have a 
COIN-centric mission set, but are still tied to the large (proportionally) base, and 
the tertiary demands such responsibility places upon a Company Commander.26  
These demands include force protection, logistical functions, command and 
control, and training, all of which consume two of the most valuable resources in 
                                            
25 Dennis Sullivan, Interview with LTC Dennis Sullivan. 3–4 
26 U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD News Briefing with Colonel John P. Johnson from 
Afghanistan at the Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington, VA,” (Department of Defense Webpage: 
21 November 2008), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4321 
(accessed 14 July 2010), 2. 
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a COIN fight – time, and Soldiers.  Initial explorations into contemporary case 
studies and unit-level After Action Reviews (AARs), and my own recent combat 
experience in Afghanistan, indicate that contemporary conventional elements are 
having varied levels of success in the conduct of COIN campaigns, but it is not 
uniform.  Task organizations vary at all echelons, but so do the specific 
operational environments of each unit.27 
B. A CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLE 
For the researcher to place historical COIN forces in perspective, an 
analysis of a modern model of a COIN force is required.  Key to the argument is 
the difference between the doctrinally organized formation and the mission-
oriented organization that evolved after several months in the combat theater.  
Figure 3 represents the doctrinal organization of a Light, Airborne, or Air Assault 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron.  The MTOE 
supports this organization with personnel, vehicles, weapons, and equipment, 
while the doctrine drives the training budgetary constraints, both in time, and 
money.  Note the two motorized reconnaissance troops, one dismounted 
reconnaissance troop, the headquarters and headquarters troop, and the forward 
support troop.  With a squadron headquarters, three maneuver troop 
headquarters, six mounted platoons, and two dismounted platoons, an RSTA can 
accomplish the following tactical goals on a mobile battlefield. Within the 
complex, dynamic conditions and threat profiles of future OEs, the squadron is 
essential to successful Army and joint operations in several ways: 
• It provides a significant dismounted or mounted 
reconnaissance force. 
 
• It enables the higher commander to decisively employ his 
maneuver battalions and joint fires and to choose times and 
places for engagement to his advantage. 
                                            
27 TF Currahee, Afghan Commander AAR Book, Currahee Edition, (West Point, N.Y.: U.S. 
Army Center for Company-level Leaders, 2009), 
https://call2.army.mil/docs/doc5803/CURRAHEE.pdf (accessed 29 December 2009), 27-30, 37. 
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• It maximizes security of the higher headquarters by providing 
timely, accurate, and relevant combat information.  
 
• It helps the higher commander achieve advantages over an 
enemy or adversary in terms of the ability to collect, process, 
and disseminate information.28 
 
                 
Figure 2.   Doctrinal IBCT RSTA Squadron Organization29 
 
Figure 3 displays an example of the heavily fragmented, but equally 
heavily augmented, RSTA Squadron in a COIN environment.  The 1-61 Cavalry 
Squadron, a subordinate element of the 4/101 BCT (AASLT), fought in the 
Paktya province of Afghanistan from February 2008 to March of 2009.  The unit 
was reorganized into six distinct subcommands in order to control four Combat 
Outposts and one Forward Operating Base (one Platoon team is detached to an 
adjacent battalion).  This unit did not fight screening actions in support of the 
larger BCT, but sustained a COIN-oriented mission set within a population-
centric approach.  Rather than executing an offensive or defensive operational 
                                            
28 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-20.96 (Reconnaissance and Cavalry 
Squadron). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2010, 
https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_c/pdf/fm3_20x96.pdf  (accessed 11 
November 2010), 1–1. 
29 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-20.96 (Reconnaissance and Cavalry 
Squadron), 1–8. 
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set across a linear battlespace, the Squadron was stationary and widely 
dispersed across the entire province.  Note the creation of a third platoon within 
the dismounted reconnaissance troop, and the creation of a combat platoon 
within the Squadron Headquarters section.  To support the large logistical 
footprint, the Forward Support Troop subdivided, and pushed its special skills 
soldiers forward.  Note also the augmentation to the Squadron Task Force: 
Military Police, Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, additional mortars and 
snipers, ANSF training and liaison teams, tactical PSYOP personnel, and 
additional military intelligence assets.   
 
 
Figure 3.   IBCT RSTA Squadron in a COIN Environment30 
The organizational line chart in Figure 3 represents one contemporary 
squadron’s evolution, while in theater.  The researcher would ask, how much 
more effective could this organization have been, had this task organization been 
in effect during the home station training, prior to the deployment?   
                                            
30 Eric Sauer, Jeremy Peifer, and Oleksandr Tkachuk, “1-61 CAV Squadron in the Battle for 
the KG Pass (Jun–Aug 2008).”  Paper read at Organizational Design for Special Operations 
class, Naval Postgraduate School, 10 December 2009. 
 20
 A concise, historical analysis of prior international COIN forces, used as a 
basis for determining situational appropriate force packages in a COIN 
environment would be value added to the Brigade Combat Team- and Battalion 
Task Force-echelon commanders and staffs.  There is no common metric to 
determine the force required for a specific operational environment in 
Afghanistan; logic would dictate that the disposition, composition, and strength of 
the enemy forces would serve as a factor in this decision, but how does this 
apply to an enemy element that does not wear a uniform?  How does a 
commander determine the extent, or the potentiality of, an insurgency, and then 
subsequently assign his forces to attain his intended outcomes?     
C. A THEORETICAL WAY AHEAD 
 As noted in John Nagl’s argument in Joint Forces Quarterly, the 
American military institution remains focused on high intensity war.  The Vietnam 
conflict was regarded as an abnormality, and the “American Way of War” was 
reaffirmed in the 1991 Gulf War with Iraq.31  The very culture of the American 
military is oriented on this model of attrition-based warfare, versus relational-
maneuver style warfare, as described by Edward Luttwak.32  He goes on to 
argue that if such an attrition-based armed force (the U.S. Army, as an example), 
should engage in a low-intensity conflict, the best option for that force, and for the 
nation, is to design a force more capable of dealing with an amorphous 
environment.  Luttwak’s solution is contentious: combining the existing Special 
Forces organizations with a derivative of light infantry in Divisional strength, with 
the hybrid infantry formations fulfilling a supporting role to the Special Forces.  In 
                                            
31 John Nagl, “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In,” 22. 
32 Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Conflict,” 341.  Luttwak differentiates the two 
characteristics of forces as internal versus external focused in their view on the operating 
environment, and caveats his argument with a statement that all forces fall on a line between the 
two extremes.  The closer a particular force falls toward being pure attrition, the more they focus 
on internal administrations and operations; warfare becomes a function of “administering superior 
material resources” against an enemy in a mechanistic fashion.  The closer a particular force falls 
toward being pure relational-maneuver, the more that force becomes outward regarding.  This 
force identifies the weakness of the opponent, and reconfigures itself to capitalize on these 
weaknesses and achieve victory. 
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speaking to the contemporary COIN struggle the United States faces, and to the 
echoes of Army reconstruction post-Vietnam, John Nagl remarks, “For these 
reasons, the security of the Nation and its interests demand that the army 
continue to learn and adapt to counterinsurgency and irregular warfare and that it 
institutionalize these adaptations so they are not forgotten again.”33   
 Generals Petraeus and Amos discuss the learning nature of historically 
successful COIN forces in the opening chapter of FM 23-4, and list a series of 
characteristics of these organizations.  The Marine Corps command in the I 
Corps AOR in Vietnam, 1965, exhibited a number of these traits, which led to the 
creation of the CAP platoons that enjoyed much success.  Such learning and 
evolving organizations typically have: 
• Developed COIN doctrine and practices locally 
• Established local training centers during COIN operations 
• Regularly challenged their assumptions, both formally and 
informally. 
• Learned about the broader world outside the military and 
requested outside assistance in understanding foreign 
political, cultural, social, and other situations beyond their 
experience 
• Promoted suggestions from the field 
• Fostered open communications between senior officers and 
their subordinates 
• Established rapid avenues of disseminating lessons learned 
• Coordinated closely with governmental and nongovernmental 
partners at all command levels 
• Proved open to soliciting and evaluating advice from the local 
people in the conflict zone.34 
 
 While case studies and AARs of the contemporary fight show that U.S. 
Army BCT’s have further decentralized their structure upon arriving in theater, 
                                            
33 John Nagl, “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In,” 21. 
34David H. Petraeus and James F. Amos, FM 3-24: United States Army and United States 
Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Kissimmee, FL: Signalman Publishing, 2009), xi. 
 22
and sustained success by doing so, can we show a value to designing such 
forces prior to arriving in theater, and training them as so reorganized?35  Paul 
Grant succinctly summarizes the criticality of pre-deployment training, in the 
contemporary, rotational environment of deployments: 
The purpose of pre-deployment training is to prepare Soldiers to 
conduct the missions they will execute while deployed.  Even 
though environments and enemies morph over time, pre-
deployment training should, at the very least, arm Soldiers with the 
requisite skills they need to be initially effective and survivable in 
the operational environment, and thus able to adapt and refine their 
abilities as the situation develops.  If pre-deployment training is 
inadequate, a unit would arrive to its operational area without the 
requisite skills and initially be attempting to catch up to enemy 
forces to match their proficiency.  Soldiers would hit the ground at a 
disadvantage to the enemy, instead of being able to arrive equal, 
identify, adapt, and surpass.  Due to the ever-changing 
environment, it is completely unrealistic to expect any training plan 
conducted now to be completely sufficient later for the duration of a 
deployment.36 
 Grant’s comments describe the initial deployments of a number of the 
forces involved in this study’s cases.  I take his question further: what if the 
salient issue of assigning General Purpose conventional forces to a COIN 
struggle was taken out of the expeditionary model of employment, and a force in 
being was constructed that was designed, equipped and manned to conduct 
COIN as a primary mission set, in perpetuity?  Such a force, regionally oriented, 
with stabilized personnel retention, would not incur such an additional training 
cost upon the nation, as does the annual training of ROMO soldiers to conduct 
COIN tasks. 
 In a similar fashion to Luttwak’s sliding scale, the answer falls between 
institutionalizing COIN lessons learned, and creating a specialized branch of the 
infantry that is COIN-centric and regionally oriented.  The subsequent chapters in 
this document will display a variety of historical models of COIN training, task 
                                            
35 Dennis Sullivan, Interview with LTC Dennis Sullivan, 3, 7–8. 
36 Paul M. Grant,  “Increasing the Effectiveness of Army Pre-deployment Training.“ Master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2010, 7. 
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organization and operations.  Analysis of these models draws correlations to the 
Nagl arguments regarding adaptability and flexibility of forces involved in COIN; 
institutionalizing these mental and physical challenges will be an enduring burden 
to Army commanders, trainers and logisticians. 
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III. COIN AGAINST COMMUNISTS 
--We believe in the eventual return of sovereign rights and self-
government to peoples who have been deprived of them by force 
--We believe that all peoples who are prepared for self government 
should be permitted to choose their own form of government by 
their own freely expressed choice, without interference from any 
foreign source.  This is true in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, as well as 
in the Western Hemisphere 
--We shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon any 
nation by the force of any foreign power.37 
President Harry S. Truman 
 
A.   VIETNAM AND THE U.S.M.C. COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS 
 America’s conventional military entered the Indochina conflict with cadres 
of military advisors, drawn from across the ranks of the existing forces.  Arriving 
as a “mere handful” of advisors to control the flow of American military assistance 
in 1950, the personnel strength grew in 1960 to 300 total Americans,38 and 
culminated in a staggering 542,000 uniformed members in 1969.39  The military 
ground forces in Vietnam never adopted a counterinsurgency mindset; U.S. Army 
general officers born of the Jominian philosophies of World War II considered the 
metric of winning a war was the destruction of the opposing nation-state’s military 
                                            
37 Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: 
Random House, 1988), 148.  Originally in a speech President Truman made on 27 October 1945, 
addressing the post WWII international audience in an homage to the 12 points of President 
Woodrow Wilson’s construct; of the 12, these three seemed directly pointed at Ho Chi Minh’s 
request for U.S protectorate status of Vietnam. 
38 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam, 5. 
39 John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 173. 
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forces.40  Many of these senior leaders were veterans of the Korean conflict from 
1948-53, and this experience further solidified the corporate mentality.  The 
Korean experience added the operational model of external foreign support to a 
Communist-inspired insurgency, through the introduction of conventional 
invasion forces from a third nation; China shared borders with North Korea and 
North Vietnam.  The U.S. Army had also seen this Communist foreign support 
model in the Greek Civil War, from 1946-49.  The warfighting doctrine, and thusly 
the organization and equipment, that the U.S. Army took to Vietnam was based 
on the collective past experiences in World War II, the Greek Civil War, and 
South Korea.41  While the U.S. Army Special Forces and CIA had isolated 
operational COIN success in the Darlac Province with the Civilian Irregular 
Defense Groups (CIDG) program in 1961-62, there were no conventional Army 
units specifically oriented on conducting COIN operations.42   
 The U.S. Army organized itself from the company-echelon and higher in 
order to more efficiently execute jungle-oriented light infantry and air assault 
operations against the elusive main force battalions of the Viet Cong (VC) and 
People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN); the United States Marine Corps in the I Corps 
Tactical Area of Operations (TAOR) chose a different path based on their 
organizational history of fighting the nation’s small wars in the early part of the 
20th Century.43  From 1965-1970, the Marine Corps placed 15 man, NCO-led 
                                            
40 John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 16–18.  Carl von Clausewitz observed 
Napoleon’s mobilization of the entirety of the French nation as a “revolution in military affairs.”  In 
the ancien regime of European politics and military strategy, war was the sport of kings, fought by 
professionals; hence, the uniqueness of the Clausewitzian trinity of the people, the government, 
and the military.  Antoine-Henri Jomini, a contemporary, interpreted Napoleon’s strategy in a 
different light, emphasizing strategy, invariable scientific principles, and “offensive action to mass 
forces against a weaker enemy at some decisive point” in order to gain victory.  Jomini’s tangible 
and quantifiable mentality and fixation on the offensive is often confused with von Clausewitz’ 
theorems of situational analysis and the succinctness of Jomini’s metrics have been more 
palatable to the American Army than the Clausewitzian, “it depends,” answer. 
41 Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths, 3. 
42 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam, 70-71. 
43 John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 178.  The standard infantry battalion in the 
Army inventory was increased by one rifle company and one heavy weapons company; the intent 
was to “devise a light, mobile organization that could fight these small engagements all over the 
country.”   
 27
squads in the small villages in the TAOR.  These Marines, in partnership with 
local Popular Forces (PF), Revolutionary Development (RD) forces, National and 
Local Police, and local governance, formed Combined Action Program (CAP) 
platoons, and focused on the physical security of the agrarian, largely rural 
populations.44  Though specially selected, and moderately trained in-theater, 
these conventional Marine elements conducted population-centric COIN with 
historically viable results.  Compared to the then-contemporary search-and-
destroy operations utilized by other conventional elements, the CAP platoons 
were an economical investment, relative to risk, national treasure, and blood.45 
 The Marine CAP concept was evolutionary in nature; none of the assigned 
personnel trained as a unit in this capacity outside of the Vietnam Theater.  At its 
inception, MAJ Cullen Zimmermann, the battalion executive officer of 3rd of the 
4th Marines, hand selected the initial four rifle squads from across the breadth of 
the battalion.  As the program grew, I Corps established a two-week school that 
instructed selectees in Vietnamese language and culture, military-civil 
operations, and tactics.  The selectees had to be volunteers for the program, 
have a commander’s recommendation, have at least two months in country, and 
at least six months remaining on their tours.  The quality of the program was not 
a function of the quality of the training, but that of the individuals selected to 
participate.  As the program matured, the leadership found it increasingly difficult 
to populate the CAP platoons; line infantry commanders in the parent units were 
reluctant to give up their best officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, and 
there was no additional Marine forces authorized to back-fill the CAP selectees.  
Consequent to this decrease in quality among selectees after 1968, performance 
began to drop within the program.46 
                                            
44 Peter Brush, “Civic Action: The Marine Corps Experience in Vietnam, Part I,” 2. 
45 F. J. (Bing) West, The Village, 50. 
46 Keith F. Kopets, “The Combined Action Program: Vietnam,” Small Wars Journal, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kopets.htm (accessed 30 November 2010), 1–2; Peter 
Brush, “Civic Action: The Marine Corps Experience in Vietnam, Part I,” 2–3. 
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 Using the RAND “Victory Has 1000 Fathers” series of metrics as noted in 
Chapter I, I have marked trends and tendencies of the U.S.M.C CAP platoons, 
insofar as observations within the literature of their actions.  Table 5 describes 
these results with a simple “Y” (yes) or “N” (no) annotation; in mixed result 
findings, the reader will find a “Y/N”.  Annotations of “N/A” indicated either an 
insufficiency of data either for or against exhibition of a certain COIN practice, or 
a subjective assessment by the researcher placing the practice in some manner 
outside of the abilities and scope of the CAP platoons. 
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Table 3.   Tabular Results of U.S.M.C CAP Platoons in Vietnam 
 The U.S.M.C. CAP platoons were highly effective in executing “good” 
COIN practices.  Executing strategic communications was not within their 
purview at the village level; one example of the scope of a platoon’s area of 
U.S.M.C CAP Platoons in Vietnam 
15 Good COIN Practices 12 Bad COIN Practices 
N/A • The COIN force adhered to several strategic communication principles. 
• The COIN force used both collective 
punishment and escalating repression. N/A 
Y • The COIN force significantly reduced tangible insurgent support. 
• The primary COIN force was an external 
occupier. Y 
Y 
• The government established or 
maintained legitimacy in the area of 
conflict. 
• COIN force or government actions 
contributed to substantial new 
grievances claimed by the insurgents. 
N/A 
N/A • The government was at least a partial democracy. 
• Militias worked at cross-purposes with 
the COIN force or government. N 
Y 
• COIN force intelligence was adequate to 
support effective engagement or 
disruption of insurgents. 
• The COIN force resettled or removed 
civilian populations for population control. N/A 
N 
• The COIN force was of sufficient 
strength to force the insurgents to fight 
as guerrillas. 
• COIN force collateral damage was 
perceived by the population in the area 
of conflict as worse than the insurgents’. 
N/A 
Y • The government/state was competent.  • In the area of conflict, the COIN force 




• The COIN force avoided excessive 
collateral damage, disproportionate use 
of force, or other illegitimate applications 
of force. 
• The COIN force failed to adapt to 
changes in adversary strategy, 
operations, or tactics. 
N/A 
Y 
• The COIN force sought to engage and 
establish positive relations with the 
population in the area of conflict. 
• The COIN force engaged in more 




• Short-term investments, improvements 
in infrastructure or development, or 
property reform occurred in the area of 
conflict controlled or claimed by the 
COIN force. 
• The insurgent force was individually 
superior to the COIN force by being 
either more professional or better 
motivated. 
Y/N 
• The COIN force or its allies relied on 
looting for sustainment. N/A Y 
• The majority of the population in the 
area of conflict supported or favored the 
COIN force. 
Y 
• The COIN force established and then 
expanded secure areas. 
Y • The COIN force had and used uncontested air dominance. 
Y 
• The COIN force provided or ensured the 
provision of basic services in areas that 
it controlled or claimed to control. 
Y 
• The perception of security was created 
or maintained among the population in 
areas that the COIN force claimed to 
control. 
• The COIN force and government had 





operations was five square miles, and a population of 5,000.47  The platoons 
discussed in the literature were quite successful at disrupting the tangible 
insurgent support; they were able to kill, capture, or otherwise disrupt Vietcong 
tax collectors, and were able to interdict food shipments of rice and fish to the 
Vietcong and PAVN formations outside of their AO.48  The central government of 
South Vietnam did attempt to maintain legitimacy throughout the I Corps AOR; 
the Revolutionary Development council, as well as the RD soldiers, interacted 
with the villages and the CAP elements, working on both point defense missions, 
and agricultural development projects.  Some isolated frictions developed 
between the Popular Forces (recruited from the local area) and the RD forces, 
recruited from the urbanized, southern areas of SVN; this affected the CAP only 
at a tactical level.49   
 The governance of Vietnam during the period of 1965-70 was a shifting 
set of military autocracies that under the advisement of American forces, partially 
espoused democratic principles.  Tactical levels of intelligence increased as the 
Marines developed deeper relations with the affected village population; this was 
compounded by the trust and interdependency of the combined team, namely the 
Popular Forces, and the local police officers.50  This intelligence network was 
crucial to the success of the Marines’ COIN mission, as well as their survival; in 
two incidents in the Bihn Nghia village, the VC and NVA massed into 
conventional formations, and attempted to obliterate the Marines at Fort Page.  
The first attempt, a 140-man combined force, was repulsed at the cost of five 
Americans KIA and six PF, KIA.51  A larger NVA and VC force attempted, months 
                                            
47 F. J. (Bing) West, The Village, 176. 
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49 F. J. (Bing) West, The Village, 105; Keith F. Kopets, “The Combined Action Program: 
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50 Keith F. Kopets, “The Combined Action Program: Vietnam,” 2; F. J. (Bing) West, The 
Village, 136. 
51 Peter Brush, “Civic Action: The Marine Corps Experience in Vietnam, Part I,” 3; Max Boot, 
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later, to repeat the assault, but a single Marine rifle shot repulsed them; the 
Marines and PF received information from the villagers that the assault was 
coming, and the shot was a costly signal to the combined enemy force, 
communicating the solidarity and readiness of the village.52  The local village 
government was competent about answering to the populace’s demands, and 
was tightly nested with the CAP Platoon in policy and actions, such as enforcing 
curfews, and managing the schools system.53  The Marines were stringent about 
controlling collateral damage, and they maintained a tight control as to whom of 
the military, either American, South Vietnamese, or Allied, conducted operations 
in their villages.  In the example of Bihn Nghia , no aircraft were allowed to fire 
within 5 kilometers of the town, and all supporting artillery charts within the area 
had the zone marked as a “No Fire Area”.54  The low body counts reported by 
the CAP platoons earned the ire of GEN Westmoreland, but control of lethal 
effects made them more effective as protectors of the populace.55   
 The platoons lived in the villages, consuming their daily meals as guests, 
and interacting with the local government and the populace; while they were not 
able to offer Commander’s Emergency Relief Funds (CERP) for short-term 
development projects, they lent their labor to the agrarian-oriented, economic 
base.  Particularly in the village of Bihn Nghia, the population supported the 
Marines and the Popular Forces, favoring them over the Vietcong.56  Writ large, 
the I Corps CAP program expanded from an isolated Joint Action detachment in 
August 1965 in Phu Bai, to a peak of 114 platoons spread over the five provinces 
within I Corps AOR.  Though not inter-connected or mutually supporting as in the 
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“oil spot” model of counterinsurgency,57 through the five-year period of 
operations, the CAP platoons secured 800 villages, and an estimated 500,000 
civilians.58  The COIN force worked in an environment of uncontested air 
dominance; the helicopter enabled resupply, transportation, and medical 
evacuation, as well as aerial interdiction and close air support.  The evacuation 
aspect was critical to the isolated American forces; evacuation of Marines, PFs, 
governance, and civilians was a crucial benefit that the Americans brought to the 
Civil Action Program, and a key action-based strategic communication of 
commitment to the supported villages.59  The Marines ensured the basic services 
of the local school system and intermediate medical care continued despite 
enemy activity.  With these civic effects, and the security brought by the 
combined team, the populace had a strong perception of security within the 
areas the CAPs operated in.60 
 The results of my research indicates the Marines in the CAP platoons 
conducted fewer of the “bad” COIN practices.  While many of the “bad” practices 
occurred throughout the MAC-V Theater, executed by other members of the 
uniformed services, the CAP platoons avoided some of the most controversial 
practices.  They did not use collective punishment or escalating repression, and 
their actions brought no new grievances against themselves or the governance, 
as claimed by the VC propaganda machines.  As American forces, they were 
seen by villagers as an external occupier initially, but came to be regarded more 
as guests and members of the villages, as time progressed.  Collectively, the 
Marines minimized collateral damage, preferring close maneuver, stealth, night 
patrols, and small arms fire to maintain security in their AOs.61  In the I Corps 
AOR, there was little utilization of the population relocation technique; the 
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Strategic Hamlet program foundered at its inception in 1962-63, and a wide-scale 
reengagement of the concept was never attempted.62  A key “no” answer that could 
be interpreted in a different light is the question of militias working at cross-purposes 
to the COIN force and the governance.  In Bihn Nghia, the combined CAP platoon 
was so tightly integrated that the Popular Force commander, with the Marines as 
subordinate elements, often led missions.  While this in itself may go against the 
existing policies of the day, it did prove a dangerous situation when the rural PF 
would quarrel with the urban RD forces, who were dispatched from the central 
government in Saigon.  This unified manner of command, despite the frictions, may 
indicate a metric of success in the Marines’ training and development of the PF, 
pursuant to their standard operating procedures instilled in 1967.63   
 As the CAP program increased in size and scope, the initial highly trained 
and specially selected volunteers from the Infantry battalions gave way to other 
Marines from various service and service support echelons; from 1968-70, CAP 
tactical performance and professionalism in the field decreased as the quality 
recruits rotated home.64  The last negative response is a general comment 
discussed earlier insofar the relationship between the central governance in Saigon 
and the COIN force; represented by the RD forces, the central government had 
different goals and ideals than the local government.  The Marines allied themselves 
strongly to the ideals of the local governance, and were consequently critical of the 
Saigon government, and the efforts of the RDs in Bihn Nghia.65 
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IV. COIN AGAINST ISLAMISTS 
They had the taste for liberty, the sense of justice and the instinct 
for generosity.  They wanted to create a multiracial, free, fraternal 
and prosperous society, to set an example for a world divided 
between rich and poor peoples.  One word symbolized their 
ambition: “integration”!  Opposite under the striking red and green 
banner of Islam, the enemy preached racial hatred and religious 
fanaticism, the arbitrary terrorism of a one-party dictatorship…to 
win the hearts of the population, they turned themselves into 
medical orderlies, administrators, water irrigation project managers, 
overseers of the rural economy…  To protect them, they also 
became policemen, judges, and executioners.66 
Jean Pouget,  
Veteran of Indochina and Algeria 
A. ALGERIA AND THE FRENCH AIRBORNE 
 The Algerian War, fought from 1954 to 1962, was one of the critical 
decolonization wars to follow World War II.  Major antagonists were French 
federated forces, and a number of Algerian militant independence movements; 
this war was fought nearly concurrently with French decolonization efforts in 
French Indochina (Vietnam), and severely disrupted the national characteristics 
and values systems of both North Africa and Metropolitan (European) France.  
The National Liberation Front (FLN) initiated the conflict on 1 November 1954 by 
perpetrating nationwide acts of violence against European settlers, and pro-
French Muslim civilians; this was the so-called “All-Saints Day Massacre.”  The 
French colonial forces initiated a massive series of repercussive actions that 
would set the stage for ever-increasing cycles of heedless violence and 
excessive bloodletting, practiced routinely by either side of the COIN fight.  The 
French forces, among them the 10th Airborne, the celebrated group of 
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paratroopers responsible for the successful, but bloody, Battle of Algiers in 1956-
57, never succeeded in reducing the tangible support for the insurgency, 
especially among the urban Muslim population from which the FLN drew its 
ranks.  Algeria remains a prime example of the cumulative effect of long duration, 
low-intensity conflict upon a democratically based government.  While the military 
efforts of the various branches of the French military succeeded in achieving 
tactical and operational victory at nearly every turn, Algeria was lost to France by 
growing public antipathy to the war, and international outcries against perceived 
French excesses of violence and use of torture.  The FLN and other revolutionary 
movements within Algeria effectively turned a military struggle into a political 
struggle, and nearly destroyed France on their way toward independence.67   
 Using the RAND “Victory Has 1000 Fathers” series of metrics as noted in 
Chapter I, I have marked the trends and tactics of the French Airborne troops, 
insofar as observations within the literature of their actions.  Some aspects of the 
RAND metrics are of a scope larger than a tactical or operational unit of 
organization; in these cases, I refer to historical observations of French national 
policy, or the policies of the military governorship of Algeria.  Table 4 describes 
these results with a simple “Y” (yes) or “N” (no) annotation; in mixed result 
findings, the reader will find a “Y/N”.  Annotations of “N/A” indicated either an 
insufficiency of data either for or against exhibition of a certain “Good” or “Bad” 
COIN practice, or a subjective assessment by the researcher placing the practice 
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Table 4.   Tabular Results of French Airborne in Algeria 
 Though France lost the Algerian War, the French Airborne battalions did 
execute a number of the RAND “Good” COIN practices.  The government of 
Algeria, France, and the military forces did execute a number of strategic 
communications principles.  While some attempts were meaningful and some 
French Airborne in Algeria 
15 Good COIN Practices 12 Bad COIN Practices 
Y • The COIN force adhered to several strategic communication principles. 
• The COIN force used both collective 
punishment and escalating repression. Y 
Y/N • The COIN force significantly reduced tangible insurgent support. 
• The primary COIN force was an external 
occupier. Y 
Y 
• The government established or 
maintained legitimacy in the area of 
conflict. 
• COIN force or government actions 
contributed to substantial new 
grievances claimed by the insurgents. 
Y 
Y • The government was at least a partial democracy. 
• Militias worked at cross-purposes with 
the COIN force or government. Y 
Y 
• COIN force intelligence was adequate to 
support effective engagement or 
disruption of insurgents. 
• The COIN force resettled or removed 
civilian populations for population control. Y 
Y/N 
• The COIN force was of sufficient 
strength to force the insurgents to fight 
as guerrillas. 
• COIN force collateral damage was 
perceived by the population in the area 
of conflict as worse than the insurgents’. 
Y/N 
N • The government/state was competent.  • In the area of conflict, the COIN force 




• The COIN force avoided excessive 
collateral damage, disproportionate use 
of force, or other illegitimate applications 
of force. 
• The COIN force failed to adapt to 
changes in adversary strategy, 
operations, or tactics. 
N/A 
N 
• The COIN force sought to engage and 
establish positive relations with the 
population in the area of conflict. 
• The COIN force engaged in more 




• Short-term investments, improvements 
in infrastructure or development, or 
property reform occurred in the area of 
conflict controlled or claimed by the 
COIN force. 
• The insurgent force was individually 
superior to the COIN force by being 
either more professional or better 
motivated. 
Y/N 
• The COIN force or its allies relied on 
looting for sustainment. Y N 
• The majority of the population in the 
area of conflict supported or favored the 
COIN force. 
N 
• The COIN force established and then 
expanded secure areas. 
Y • The COIN force had and used uncontested air dominance. 
N/A 
• The COIN force provided or ensured the 
provision of basic services in areas that 
it controlled or claimed to control. 
N 
• The perception of security was created 
or maintained among the population in 
areas that the COIN force claimed to 
control. 
• The COIN force and government had 





were meaningless, exercising this COIN practice infers attempting to connect 
with the host population, which is a net positive.  This was manifest in the battle 
for Algiers in 1956-57, and in tactical leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts 
within the contested areas of the urban areas of the country.  France also had to 
communicate strategically with the neighboring country of Tunisia, whom was 
offering sanctuary to members of the FLN.68  Attempts at social and political 
reform, and the resultant communiqués describing such efforts, were also 
considered strategic communications.  The Airborne troops, in particular the 10th 
Airborne Battalion, were the actuaries of executing this French policy.69   
 The data is inconclusive as to whether the efforts of the Airborne reduced 
tangible insurgent support.  In the initial stages of the conflict, the French 
approached the insurgency with a heavy hand, relying on collective punishment 
and escalating repression of the host populace.70  While this may have increased 
the amount of tangible support for elements of the FLN or ALN, the insurgents 
themselves conducted atrocities against both the host population of Muslims, and 
the Europeans, in latter stages of the conflict.71   
 The government of France was a democracy, but Algeria was considered 
less of a colony, and more a province of France; the official power in Algeria 
rested in European appointees who were supported by voting and taxpaying 
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vast bulk of the Muslim Algerian populace.  Without renouncing their 
subservience to sharia law, the Muslims could not attain French citizenship, and 
the accompanying voting rights.72   
 The French Airborne optimized their intelligence networks as the war 
progressed, and demonstrated this capacity through the stunning victories over 
the insurgent cells in the Battle of Algiers.73  However, a bulk of the operational 
intelligence gained was through the contentious use of torture; the ALN was able 
to vilify sufficiently this practice on a global scale, and even earned the French an 
admonition from America and the United Nations.74  This practice in itself 
generated tangible support to the insurgency, and further distanced the Airborne 
from the Muslim populace of Algeria. 
 In the initial stages of the conflict, from 1954 -1957, the presence of the 
French military was sufficient to force the insurgency to fight in small scale, 
guerrilla-style engagements.  As the insurgency grew, and the deprivations and 
privation enforced by the French military swelled the ranks of the Algerian 
Muslims, the FLN was able to form company, battalion and regimental size 
forces.  The Soviet, Tunisian, and Egyptian governments aided in the material 
and logistical aspects of this.75   
 The French national government, and the colonial-style Algerian 
government, was not competent during the period of the conflict.  Domestic 
political and public pressure removed from power six French prime ministers 
because of the enduring conflict, and the Fourth Republic, en toto, was toppled 
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as a direct correlation to the accumulating public discontent with the prosecution 
of the war.  As the war progressed and neared a close in the early 1960s, 
Charles De Gaulle and his Fifth Republic was very nearly toppled as the war 
spread to Metropolitan French territory through Islamic acts of terrorism.76  
 The initial reaction of the French governance and military was to use 
excessive force in order to crush the rebellion of the FLN and ALN; the inciting 
incident of the conflict was the All Saints Day Massacre of European settlers in 
an organized fashion across the breadth of Algeria in 1954.  The French revenge 
for these attacks was sanguine, and largely focused on the Muslim population 
that was in the immediate areas.77   
 The French Airborne made no decisive attempts to engage the Muslim 
population in contested areas with targeted information operations (IO)  with 
positive Information Operations (IO).  However, they maintained contact with the 
minority European settlers in the urban areas.78 Conversely, the French 
governance did attempt to instill improvements in infrastructure and property 
reform later in the conflict.  By 1957, the situation had so degraded that the little 
concessions the French offered were unable to win popular support of the 
Muslim majority.  No amount of positive IO could, as a singular effort, stem the 
tide of religious and nationalistic insurgency.79   
 The Muslim population in Algeria began to see the French Airborne, in 
particular the 10th Battalion, as foreign occupiers; the European minority was in 
favor of them, but was unable to influence the insurgency’s tangible support 
networks.  The heavy hand of the French Army and the 10th Airborne would fall 
upon the disaffected urban Muslim population of Algiers in 1956-57, and would 
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magnify the people’s distance from the French colonial forces.  French practices 
of collective punishment and repression further alienated them from the Muslim 
population.80   
 During most of the conflict, French Airborne forces were used in a mobile 
pursuit model against elements of the ALN, while other French formations of 
mechanized, armored, and conventional infantry were used to secure areas 
within their Areas of Responsibility (AORs).  In this, the French did not establish, 
expand or sustain secured areas, with the exception of the Battle of Algiers.81  
The French effort largely depended upon uncontested air domination, both in the 
use of organic fixed wing and rotary wing assets as aerial weapons platforms, 
and to enable troop movement and vertical envelopments of FLN enclaves.  This 
air domination was key to the 10th Airborne’s successful battle for Algiers, where 
helicopters were used both tactically, and in a Psychological Operations 
(PSYOP) perspective, having been equipped with loudspeakers.82   
 Subsequent research determined that the French Airborne did not make 
efforts to ensure basic services remained in contested areas.  Within an 
operational context, the Airborne (and other French Forces, either metropolitan, 
Muslim, or Foreign Legion) would clear a series of villages, and move on to the 
next intelligence-driven hotspot, without maintaining an enduring presence to 
ensure the insurgents were denied tangible support.83  Lastly, the French failed 
                                            
80 Henri Coustaux, “The Algerian War: Personal Account of Colonel Henri Coustaux,” 230-
32; Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 168–72; Alf A. Heggoy, Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency in Algeria, 158–160. 
81 Alf A. Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria, 233–38; Irwin M Wall.  
France, the United States, and the Algerian War (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
2001), 36–38; Hugh Roberts, “The Image of the French Army in the Cinematic Representation of 
the Algerian War: the Revolutionary Politics of The Battle of Algiers,” in Alexander, Martin S., 
Martin Evans, and J.F.V. Keiger (eds.), The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954-62 (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 154–55. 
82 Irwin M. Wall, France, the United States, and the Algerian War, 107; Nacera Aggoun, 
“Psychological Propaganda during the Algerian War,” 198. 
83 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 115, 198-201; Alf A. Heggoy, Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency in Algeria,134–36.  An interesting insight from Heggoy is that “…the colonial 
system was at the root of the problem.  As the French fumbled along through 1954 and 1955, and 
as the uniformed men of the National Liberation Army circulated…with apparent 
impunity…resolve grew firmer from day to day.” 
 42
to convince the Algerian populace that they were securing the areas they 
sporadically occupied.  The FLN and ALN were able to conduct acts of reprisal 
and terror against the host population, seemingly at will, in response to perceived 
or actual collaboration with the French forces, or colonial governance.84 
 In quantifying the “no” answers to the “Good Practices in COIN” column, 
the researcher has provided justification for a number of the “yes” answers on the 
“Bad Practices in COIN” column; while not a perfect zero-sum game of 
assessment, a number of the listed practices are directly antithetical to each 
other.  As discussed earlier, the French Airborne, in keeping with national policy, 
made use of collective punishment and escalating repression; this hastened the 
populace’s perceptual transition of them from colonial constabulary forces, to 
foreign occupiers, which was a direct indicator of the rise of nationalistic 
sentiment as the years of conflict continued.  The FLN and ALN were quick to 
capitalize upon the French intransigence of violence, and disseminated 
propaganda magnifying the excesses to inflame further the Muslim religious 
sensibilities, and Algerian nationalistic sentiment.85   
 The research does not indicate militias working at cross-purposes to the 
COIN force specifically.  However, a number of differing castes of French 
soldiers, such as Regulars, Conscripts, Foreign Legion, Muslim, and a wide 
variety of paramilitary organizations, fought the Algerian War.  War weariness 
among the conscripts and the Regulars, many of whom were veterans of the 
French Indochina War, had a degenerative effect on mission accomplishment 
and discipline; the Legion and the Muslim Battalions suffered from high desertion 
rates and occasional mutinies as the war progressed.86 
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 One French effort during the war was to relocate targeted populations, or 
attempt to isolate and contain populations among racial and religious lines, 
especially in the coastal urban areas.  The 10th Airborne was reasonably 
successful at this practice during the Battle of Algiers, though these isolated 
Muslim sectors became a source of tangible support for the FLN and other 
revolutionary groups within the city.  In isolating and concentrating the Muslim 
population in this fashion, French efforts to use force nearly always resulted in 
collateral damage, a situation that the insurgents were quick to exaggerate and 
publicize.  The population in the contested areas thusly perceived the COIN 
force’s use of excessive force as worse than that of the insurgents.87 
 As commented upon earlier, the French federated forces varied in 
composition, motivation, ethnicity, and professional status.  Both sides of the 
conflict conducted atrocities against the civilian populations, European or Muslim; 
as it is now, this tactic was regarded as unprofessional, even when sanctioned by 
higher command or policy.  Among the French Airborne forces, discipline was 
maintained by esprit de corps and firm leadership; among the conscript 
formations of conventional infantry, village clearance missions occasioned to 
devolve into looting and non-judicial executions, incidents of which increased in 
frequency as the war dragged along and victory for the French seemed elusive.88  
While looting for pleasure and looting for sustenance are not empirically the 
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same, the Muslim population interpreted the actions in the same light, 
contributing to the final “bad” COIN practice relative to the RAND study.89 
 The research indicates that the French military effort attained seven of 
twelve “Good” COIN practices as a “Yes” answer, while achieving eight of twelve 
“Bad” COIN practices with a similar “Yes” answer.  As noted earlier, the two sides 
of the table are nearly inverse conditions of their opposing listing, but not 
perfectly.  Crucial aspects of the “Good” practices with documented “No” answers 
are key: the force could not control the insurgents tangible support networks, 
could not gain popular support of either the European minority or Muslim 
majority, and failed to hold and expand secured areas within the contested 
zones.  When the researcher examines the individual unit practices of the 
professional Airborne forces in the COIN structure, the data is slightly 
contaminated by the totality of the French military and political efforts.  The 10th 
Airborne used excessive force, torture, and severe population control measures 
to dominate the Battle of Algiers, but attempted to marry positive IO, 
development, and social reform efforts to their kinetic efforts during and post-
conflict.  This may have been more a function of individual initiative by the tactical 
commanders, versus an ingrained or institutionalized Technique, Tactic or 
Procedure (TTP).90  This was a result of the manner in which the French Regular 
Army forces were trained.  While the constabulary and regional forces within the 
colonies were more attuned to civic action, police investigative techniques, and 
exercising restraint, the expeditionary Regulars and the Foreign Legion were 
trained, outfitted, organized and resourced in accordance with existing NATO 
mission sets of European-based linear struggles against their Warsaw Pact 
enemies.91   
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B.   AFGHANISTAN AND THE SOVIET ARMY 
In a chilling commentary that nearly describes the British adventures in 
Afghanistan in the 19th century, Les Grau describes the difficulties facing the 
Soviet Army during the Afghan War of 1979-1989, and the little-known domestic 
socio-political effects of the conflict: 
The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union structured, equipped and 
trained their forces for nuclear and high-intensity war on the great 
northern European plain and the plains  of northern China.  
However, their political leadership thrust them into the middle of the 
Afghanistan civil war to reconstitute and support a nominally 
Marxist-Leninist government.  The terrain, the climate and the 
enemy were entirely different from what they had prepared for.  In 
this locale, their equipment functioned less than optimally, their 
force structure was clearly inappropriate and their tactics were 
obviously wrong…returning soldiers were not welcomed as heroes 
or treated with respect.  A gap opened between the Armed Forces 
and the citizenry and many veterans found they could not fit back 
into the lifestyle of the complacent and self-centered citizenry.  The 
effects of the Afghanistan war reverberate throughout Russia 
today.92 
Lester W. Grau 
Preface to The Bear Went Over the Mountain 
 
 The contemporary American involvement in the conflict in Afghanistan is 
merely the latest chapter in the history of a region rife with developmental issues 
that spans over nearly two centuries of European involvement in the area.  The 
aspiring colonial powers of Great Britain, Germany and Russia nominally 
influenced the polity of Afghanistan, openly or covertly, through religiously 
legitimate emirs of various tribal and ethnical persuasions from Kabul.  In keeping 
with the disparate notion of decentralized state power that was historic 
Afghanistan, the colonial powers also entreated with tributary tribes and princes 
in the general geographical area that is Afghanistan of the present.  While we 
consider the development of the modern nation state as a function of both inter- 
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and intra-nation conflict, the lack of stability, unity, and strength of the Afghan 
nation poses a conundrum to one unfamiliar with its historic past of disunity. 
Charles Tilly makes the comment, relative to European nations, that “States 
make War, and War Makes States,” but this transitional mechanism has not 
occurred in Afghanistan, despite that Afghanistan has been a scene of nearly 
constant conflict over the last 30 years.93 
 Afghanistan has had a history of intense tribal and ethnic fault lines, and is 
bounded by the unique geography of the region.  While this loose confederation 
of social and political groupings has prevented any one foreign power, or 
domestic central polity, from holding extractive, ideological, or coercive control of 
the populace, the disparate and nebulous characteristics of the Afghan nation-
state is one of the key facets of its failed nature.  Through successive 
expeditionary adventures, the British, Germany, Russia, the USSR, and lately the 
USA, have failed to solidify the Afghanistan central governance into anything that 
remotely resembles a European state that exercises control of its populace, 
territory, economy, and borders, while retaining the legitimate use of force.   
 Understanding the Afghanistan environment requires an in-depth grasp of 
the regional history, and a thorough understanding of the ethnic and tribal 
diversity of the country.  Through just the last two centuries of foreign 
intervention, the Afghan collective national memory has developed a justifiably 
xenophobic attitude towards outside influences, despite remaining highly fiscally 
dependent upon them. 
 Attempts at creating either Soviet- or NATO-styled centralized military 
have proven to be extremely difficult, if not impossible.  Neither collectivist nor 
capitalist economic models have worked; there are not enough natural resources 
to function as a distributive, rentier economy, and the bureaucratic mechanisms 
of the central governance are not capable of performing extractive taxing of the 
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nascent industrial, agricultural, or personal income tax bases.94  The aggregate 
history of tribal and ethnic diversity of Afghanistan, dominated by the Durrani 
Pashtun, and coupled with the severe geography of the area, is one of the 
operational and strategic frictions the Soviets had to contend with during their 
ten-year adventure.95  
 The Communist authoritarian regime, known ultimately as the People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan, or PDPA, that rose to power in Afghanistan 
during the Saur Revolution in 1978 did so in an unexpected manner to the 
Soviets.  With their Stalinist flair for violence, the Communist’s progressive 
intentions against the traditional nature of the Pashtun tribal majority and 
increasing bloodthirstiness in the repression of dissidents and political 
adversaries, the Soviets were forced to act to protect their investment.96  By 
early-to-mid-1979, armed militants and tribal warlords, already identifying 
themselves as Mujahedeen (Islamic holy warriors)97 dominated 23 of 
Afghanistan’s 28 provinces, and the Stalinist PDPA was facing imminent 
demise.98   The Soviet intercession in the affairs of Afghanistan, promulgated 
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by both the condition setting for, and the invasion by air and land on 25 
December 1979, was as much a strategic expansionist move of the global 
Communist agenda, as it was an operational move to prevent a perceived 
imminent failure of the Communist Taraki government.  A successful intercession 
with overwhelming force would prevent the potential loss of face that Cold War 
international politics would surely deal the Soviets.  The Soviets additionally 
hoped to maintain the legitimacy of their invasion by highlighting a small mutual 
defense clause in a 1978 treaty, signed with their erstwhile client state.99 
 Using the RAND “Victory Has 1000 Fathers” series of metrics as noted in 
Chapter I, I have marked trends and tendencies of the Soviet conventional forces 
as they executed the conflict in Afghanistan.  While this is one of the original 30 
case studies of the RAND study, I have further augmented their strategic 
assessments with those of a tactical and operational purview, from a variety of 
sources.  Table 5 describes these results with a simple “Y” (yes) or “N” (no) 
annotation; in mixed result findings, the reader will find a “Y/N”.  Annotations of 
“N/A” indicated either an insufficiency of data either for or against exhibition of a 
certain “Good” or “Bad” COIN practice, or a subjective assessment by the 
researcher placing the practice in some manner outside of the abilities of the 
Soviet Army.  For this particular case study, there are a greater number of 
adjudications that list “Y/N”; the ten years of Soviet involvement, and three 
distinct phases of the operation, exhibit the Soviet’s adaptations to the COIN 
environment. 
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Table 5.   Tabular Results of Soviet Army in Afghanistan 
 In beginning, the analysis of the Soviet Army with their execution of 
“Good” COIN practices, it is critical to recall that, at alternating periods in time 
over the course of the conflict, PSYOP elements within the Soviet Army, and the 
government of the PDRA, attempted to conduct strategic communication with the 
Soviet Army in Afghanistan 
15 Good COIN Practices 12 Bad COIN Practices 
Y • The COIN force adhered to several 
strategic communication principles. 
• The COIN force used both collective 
punishment and escalating repression. 
Y 
N • The COIN force significantly reduced 
tangible insurgent support. 
• The primary COIN force was an external 
occupier. 
Y 
N • The government established or 
maintained legitimacy in the area of 
conflict. 
• COIN force or government actions 
contributed to substantial new 
grievances claimed by the insurgents. 
Y 
N • The government was at least a partial 
democracy. 
• Militias worked at cross-purposes with 
the COIN force or government. 
Y 
N/A • COIN force intelligence was adequate to 
support effective engagement or 
disruption of insurgents. 
• The COIN force resettled or removed 
civilian populations for population control. 
Y 
N • The COIN force was of sufficient 
strength to force the insurgents to fight 
as guerrillas. 
• COIN force collateral damage was 
perceived by the population in the area 
of conflict as worse than the insurgents’. 
Y 
N • The government/state was competent.  • In the area of conflict, the COIN force 
was perceived as worse than the 
insurgents. 
Y 
N • The COIN force avoided excessive 
collateral damage, disproportionate use 
of force, or other illegitimate applications 
of force. 
• The COIN force failed to adapt to 
changes in adversary strategy, 
operations, or tactics. 
Y 
Y • The COIN force sought to engage and 
establish positive relations with the 
population in the area of conflict. 
• The COIN force engaged in more 
coercion or intimidation than the 
insurgents. 
Y 
Y/N • Short-term investments, improvements 
in infrastructure or development, or 
property reform occurred in the area of 
conflict controlled or claimed by the 
COIN force. 
• The insurgent force was individually 
superior to the COIN force by being 
either more professional or better 
motivated. 
Y 
• The COIN force or its allies relied on 
looting for sustainment. 
Y 
N • The majority of the population in the 
area of conflict supported or favored the 
COIN force. 
N/A • The COIN force established and then 
expanded secure areas. 
Y/N • The COIN force had and used 
uncontested air dominance. 
N • The COIN force provided or ensured the 
provision of basic services in areas that 
it controlled or claimed to control. 
N • The perception of security was created 
or maintained among the population in 
areas that the COIN force claimed to 
control. 
• The COIN force and government had 





populace of Afghanistan.  This effort failed for a number of reasons.  The PDRA 
relied on television, radio, and newsprint to communicate ideas, which was 
nearly ineffectual outside of the urban areas, due to the lack of availability of 
technology, and a nearly 90% illiteracy rate among the rural peoples.  The 
Soviets attempted to indoctrinate thousands of Afghan youth into the virtues of 
Communism, either through the existing scholastic systems, or through military 
officer training in the U.S.S.R.  While these were legitimate attempts, actions did 
not match words, as the Soviet Army continued shelling urban areas claimed by 
the Mujahedeen, and clearing the rural areas of their population.100 
 The Soviets were able to reduce the tangible support of the insurgency at 
the tactical level, but only by conducting massive population relocations and 
clearance operations; by 1983, an estimated three million Afghanis were 
refugees in Pakistan or Iran.101  As the war progressed through the early-1980s, 
external support for the insurgency flowed across the Pakistan and Iran borders, 
from such disparate countries as China, Pakistan, Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United States.  These supplies included weaponry, food, medical 
supplies, communications equipment, and money.  Neither the Soviets nor the  
 
Afghan Army could stop this flow of material; the magnitude of aid neatly 
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mitigated the lack of tangible support the insurgents could not receive from the 
depopulated border regions.102 
 The PDRA government fought for legitimacy among the rural population 
since its inception in the wake of the Saur Revolution.  By instilling progressive 
social, economic, and cultural reforms, the government soon found itself branded 
as un-Islamic by the rural Sunni religious leaders.  These offenses centered 
around secular education and girls schools, conscription issues, land reform 
programs, and non-judicial imprisonment and execution of tribal elders.103  A key 
tenet of the authority of Afghan governments for the preceding 200 years had 
been the claim of rule in accordance with the Ulema, and the Koran.  With the 
revocation of the support of the Ulema from the Communist PDRA, the Afghan 
Mujahedeen were given a religiously doctrinal justification to rebel against the 
PDRA, and their Soviet sponsors.104  As noted earlier, prior to the Soviet 
invasion, the PDRA lost effective control of all but five of the country’s provinces, 
and never regained control beyond the urban areas, and major transportation 
hubs.105    
 The lack of religious legitimacy of the PDRA enabled the Pashtun tribes to 
leverage the most basic of their cultural attributes against the Afghan 
government, and against the Soviets: Pashtunwali, the ancient archetype of tribal 
honor.  The tenets of badal (revenge), melmastia (hospitality), nanawatai 
(sanctuary) and nang (honor) were known for centuries by the British,106 and 
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witnessed from both sides of the Durand line.107  The absolute adherence to 
these concepts among the rural Pashtun majority of the country served as one of 
the building blocks of the modern mujahedeen resistance.108  The modern “Holy 
Warriors” of Islam were similar to the ghazis that so confounded the British 
empire in the nineteenth century, and were enraged and inflamed by mullahs 
who saw the Communist PDPA state, backed by the Soviets, as being 
diametrically opposed to the traditional, tribal manner of life in the Pashtun 
lands.109    
 The Soviet Army was never large enough to force the mujahedeen to fight 
as guerrillas, for long.  At their peak, the Soviets only fielded a maximum of 
100,000 ground troop; this was one-fifth the number of troops America had in 
Vietnam, and Vietnam was one-fifth the size of Afghanistan.  This force package 
of five divisions, four separate brigades, four separate regiments, and sundry 
support elements comprised the 40th Army, and it attempted to defend 21 
provincial centers of government and a few economic and industrial centers.  The 
Soviet and Afghan Armies relinquished control of the vast majority of the 
countryside without contestation to the insurgency, through simple non-
presence.110    
 The PDRA government was not competent, and was barely able to 
administer anything beyond the borders of Kabul; at the onset of the Soviet 
invasion, the government was at a point of collapse, and the Afghan Army nearly 
dissolved before it came to face the full nature of the Mujahedeen insurgency.  
As a method to compensate for these strategic setbacks, the Soviet Army relied 
on excessive applications of force, with the purpose of crushing the rebellion in 
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its perceived gestational period.  The Soviets subsequently shifted their tactics to 
targeting the civilian population, intending to deprive the insurgency of tangible 
support within the rural areas of Afghanistan.111 
 As the war transitioned through 1982-84, the Soviets and PDRA 
attempted some development and civil action initiatives, attempting to gain the 
support of the populace.  During this period, the Afghan industrial capacity 
increased by 50%, several textile mills provided jobs and reinvestment capital, 
and state owned companies exploited natural gas resources.  The government, 
under pointed direction by the Soviets, attempted to recapture the support of the 
Islamic Ulema by funding the creation of 2,000 mosques, and placing 16,000 
Muslim civic and religious leaders on the central governance payroll.  
Additionally, the Soviets mandated the PDRA revoke the original inciting 
grievance, the land reformation initiatives instilled by Hafizullah Amin in 1978; by 
this stage in the war, the damage was nearly irreversible.112  The vast majority of 
Afghanistan saw the Soviet soldiers, and their perceived puppets in the PDRA, 
as atheists, apostates, and communists; while the Mujahedeen occasioned to kill 
other Afghans as a function of internal power struggles, the predominantly 
Pashtun populace favored the insurgency.113 
 Until 1986, the Soviet Army maintained air superiority over the skies of 
Afghanistan; the occasional helicopter fell prey to well placed heavy machine gun 
ambushes, or booby-trapped helicopter landing zones (HLZs), but nothing that 
prohibited freedom of maneuver.114  Beginning in 1986, the Mujahedeen 
received steady supplies of American Stinger surface-to-air missiles, which were 
simple, man portable, and deadly efficient.  Within the first year of use, the 
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Soviets lost 200 aircraft to the heat seekers, and it dramatically affected the 
manner in which they synchronized firepower and support for ground forces.115 
 The Soviet Army in executing COIN in Afghanistan was uniform about 
successfully executing all 12 of the RAND “Bad” COIN practices; I will only draw 
out the high points in this nearly diametrical comparison to COIN “Good” 
practices.  The Soviet Army and the PDRA conducted collective punishment in 
the contested areas of Afghanistan; members of the Afghan Army facilitated such 
actions prior to the Soviet Invasion during the Taraki social purges.116  In keeping 
with the Soviet escalation of the war on the Mujahedeen, massive population 
relocations occurred, creating the largest population of refugees in history, and 
indirectly setting conditions for the rise of the Taliban in the early to mid 1990s.117  
The COIN force collateral damage was viewed as worse in the contested areas 
than that of the insurgents, and the Soviets actions contributed quite substantially 
to the existing grievances of the insurgency.118  Many such events display the 
Afghan Army also working at a cross purpose to PDRA policies, but in 
conjunction with the Soviet Army.  Largely comprised of conscripts, the Soviets 
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after Soviet troops and an Afghan Communist militia unit captured the village of Kalegu in Paktia 
province from the Mujahedeen, they bound together 12 villagers, seven of whom were children, 
inside the local mosque before they burned it to the ground; nine of the twelve died.”   David 
Loyn, In Afghanistan,157; Loyn describes the totality of Soviet infrastructure destruction in a 
figure dated 1988: 1,814 schools, 31 hospitals, and 11 health centers destroyed in the contested 
zones. 
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suffered from high desertion rates among their forces; the Afghan Army was 
particularly prone to desertion.  The Afghan Army also contributed tremendous 
resources to the Mujahedeen, and examples exist of entire Afghan battalions 
defecting, with all men, weapons and equipment, to include tanks, infantry 
fighting vehicles, and supplies.119   
 Some of these resources were less tangible; in the early stages of the 
war, the unprofessional Afghan troops stole goods and material from the 
populace on a grand enough scale to further add to the popular disenchantment 
with the central government.  The economically disadvantaged Soviet conscripts 
were no better, robbing and executing rich Afghanis at checkpoints, and selling 
weapons and equipment to the highest bidder.120 
 The Taraki government, in attempting to instill land reformation across the 
breadth of Afghanistan, created the first incident of nationwide state repression in 
modern history, and served as a direct affront to the authority of the tribal leaders 
among all ethnicities, but mostly the Pashtuns.121  The salient point of 
contestation was the ideological competition between the traditional Islamic 
conservatism, and the perceived encroachment of the Occidental world, through 
the Soviet regime.  The Soviets, in a political and ideological attempt to prevent a 
loss of face in the Cold War, committed traditionally trained ROMO conscript 
armies to what was clearly foreseeable ex ante as a long duration, low-intensity 
COIN struggle.122 
                                            
119 David Loyn, In Afghanistan, 152; Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History, 219.  
Ewans mentions the defections from the PDRA government were not singular to the military 
forces.  He lists soldiers, diplomats, government officials, pilots and sports teams among his 
categories.  In 1980, a totality of 17,000 troops deserted, and the numbers increased to 30,000-
36,000 per year in 1981 and 1982. 
120 Christopher Paul, et al., “Victory Has a Thousand Fathers,” 13–15; David Loyn, In 
Afghanistan,151. 
121 Robert D. Kaplan, Soldiers of God, 116. 
122David Loyn, In Afghanistan, 141–42. Loyn remarks that the Soviet military was not 
consulted on the concept of the invasion until 10 December 1979.  Nikolai Ogarkov, the chief of 
the General Staff, received his reluctant marching orders from then Defense Minister Ustinov, 
then-head of KGB, Yuri Andropov, and foreign minister Andrei Gromyko. 
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 The Soviet Army at the inception of the Afghan War was composed mainly 
of conscript forces, led by a professional officer cadre.  Comparable, but in 
opposition to NATO, the overarching strategic purpose of the training, doctrine, 
and equipping of their ground forces was to succeed in a nuclear or high-intensity 
theater-level war in Northern Europe, or Northern China.  Further constrained by 
ponderous bureaucratic processes, the Soviet Army lacked an operational 
flexibility and mindset that would have enabled them to adapt and evolve to the 
conditions in Afghanistan, prior to the strategic tipping point of the insertion of 
American Stinger missiles into the hands of the Mujahedeen.123  Until this point 
in 1986, the Soviets were floundering, sustaining exorbitant casualties at the 
hands of the insurgency, and at the hands of the environment.124  The Soviet 
Army was able to adapt partially to the different environment.  Professional 
military schools integrated the lessons learned from the Afghan campaign, and 
prepared officers and soldiers for the conflict by emphasizing attendance at 
mountain warfare training centers, wherein regional tactics were taught under 
direction of the local tactical command.  The 40th Army leadership established 
these mountain training centers in theater.  The Soviets also derived new, non-
linear concepts in reaction to the environment, and attempted to reorganize their 
units and echelons in order to increase tactical and operational flexibility.  The 
parent organization in the U.S.S.R maintained its strategic focus on the high-
intensity template of mechanized warfare with NATO forces.  As noted by Grau, 
“…the Afghanistan war was not an all encompassing experience for the officer 
corps.  Barely 10 percent of the Soviet motorized rifle, armor, aviation and 
artillery officers served in Afghanistan.  However, a majority of airborne, air 
assault, and Spetsnaz officers served in Afghanistan.”125 
                                            
123 Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History, 228–29. 
124 Lester W. Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain, xiv. COL (ret) David Glantz in Grau’s 
Introduction comments that, for the totality of the conflict, Soviet non-battle injuries (NBI), 
specifically casualties to disease are appalling; 415,932, of which 115,308 were victims of 
infectious hepatitis, and 31,080 from typhoid fever.  Author attributes this to Soviet military 
hygiene, and the conditions surrounding troop life. 
125 Lester W. Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain, xii, xix. 
 57
 The Soviets departed in defeat in 1989, leaving behind a modestly strong 
central Afghan government, nationalized, modern military and police forces, and 
a disorganized, but financially sound, insurgency of Pakistani-supported 
mujahedeen.  Surprisingly, the PDPA government, led by Haji Najibullah in 
Kabul, would remain in power longer than the USSR, falling in March 1992 to the 
effects of civil war, and the loss of its Russian patron.126  Chaos ensued as the 
former mujahedeen commanders vied for the remnants of localized and national 
power, and used the Western-provided weapons, and those captured from the 
Soviets, to neutralize anything in their path to gain it.127 
                                            
126 Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History, 245–47; David Loyn, In Afghanistan,169–
171. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF COIN EFFORTS 
 
The Army’s culture is its personality.  It reflects the Army’s values, 
philosophy, norms, and unwritten rules.  Our culture has a powerful 
effect because our common underlying assumptions guide behavior 
and the way the Army processes information as an organization.128 
LTG Theodore G. Stroup, U.S. Army 
 
A. TABULAR COMPARISON OF COIN FORCES 
The following tables summarize the results of the COIN case studies of 
Algeria, Vietnam, and Afghanistan.  Not surprisingly, engaging in a COIN 
campaign with ROMO forces does not succeed, as shown in the studies.  We 
can also see in all three examples evidence of evolution of sub-elements of 
ROMO forces into units more attuned to conducting constabulary and civic-action 
oriented operations; in the Marine CAP example, the evolution was a polar shift 
from their traditional mission, and the results were extremely economic relative to 
a cost/benefit analysis of blood, treasure, and time.  In all three examples, we 
see also the importance of linking military action with national or foreign policy, 
and the essential nature of similarly tying the military to the inter-agency effort.  
Control of the tangible support network of an insurgency seems to be a salient 
point of success or failure for a COIN force, but the Soviet technique offers a 
warning to operational planners.  Using a Maoist comparison, draining the ocean 
to get at the fish is not a viable technique.  Not only did the masses of Afghan 
refugees generated by such a tactic inflame world opinion, but also from within 
the war orphan population of young males sprung the foot soldiers of the Taliban, 
trained and educated in Pakistan Deobandi madrassas in the interwar period.  
                                            
128 John Nagl.  Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 5–6.  Original quote in Theodore G. 
Stroup, Jr., “Leadership and Organizational Culture: Actions Speak Louder than Words,” Military 
Review LXXVI, No.1 (January/February 1996), 45. 
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Collective punishment and escalating repression, as executed by the French 
Airborne, does not work unless deliberate, and equally overwhelming, 
consequence management efforts are taken to mitigate the negative effects on a 
host population; in this, strategic communications are essential. 
 
Table 6.   Comparison of “Good” COIN Practices 
 
 “Bad” Coin Practices CAP Platoons in 
French 
Airborne in 
Soviet Army in 
Afghanistan 





Soviet Army in 
Afghanistan 
• The COIN force adhered to several strategic 
communication principles. N/A Y Y 
• The COIN force significantly reduced tangible 
insurgent support. Y Y/N N 
• The government established or maintained 
legitimacy in the area of conflict. Y Y N 
• The government was at least a partial 
democracy. N/A Y N 
• COIN force intelligence was adequate to 
support effective engagement or disruption of 
insurgents. 
Y Y N/A 
• The COIN force was of sufficient strength to 
force the insurgents to fight as guerrillas. N Y/N N 
• The government/state was competent. Y N N 
• The COIN force avoided excessive collateral 
damage, disproportionate use of force, or other 
illegitimate applications of force. 
Y N N 
• The COIN force sought to engage and establish 
positive relations with the population in the area 
of conflict. 
Y N Y 
• Short-term investments, improvements in 
infrastructure or development, or property 
reform occurred in the area of conflict controlled 
or claimed by the COIN force. 
N/A Y Y/N 
• The majority of the population in the area of 
conflict supported or favored the COIN force. Y N N 
• The COIN force established and then expanded 
secure areas. Y N N/A 
• The COIN force had and used uncontested air 
dominance. Y Y Y/N 
• The COIN force provided or ensured the 
provision of basic services in areas that it 
controlled or claimed to control. 
Y N/A N 
• The perception of security was created or 
maintained among the population in areas that 
the COIN force claimed to control. 
Y N N 
Total “Yes” 11 8 4 
Total “No” 1 8 11 
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Vietnam Algeria 
• The COIN force used both collective 
punishment and escalating repression. N/A Y Y 
• The primary COIN force was an external 
occupier. Y Y Y 
• COIN force or government actions 
contributed to substantial new grievances 
claimed by the insurgents. 
N/A Y Y 
• Militias worked at cross-purposes with the 
COIN force or government. N Y Y 
• The COIN force resettled or removed 
civilian populations for population control. N/A Y Y 
• COIN force collateral damage was 
perceived by the population in the area of 
conflict as worse than the insurgents’. 
N/A Y/N Y 
• In the area of conflict, the COIN force was 
perceived as worse than the insurgents. N/A Y Y 
• The COIN force failed to adapt to changes 
in adversary strategy, operations, or 
tactics. 
N/A N/A Y 
• The COIN force engaged in more coercion 
or intimidation than the insurgents. N/A N Y 
• The insurgent force was individually 
superior to the COIN force by being either 
more professional or better motivated. 
Y/N Y/N Y 
• The COIN force or its allies relied on 
looting for sustainment. N/A Y Y 
• The COIN force and government had 
different goals or levels of commitment. 
 
N/A Y Y/N 
Total “Yes” 2 10 12 
Total “No” 2 3 1 
 
Table 7.   Comparison of “Bad” COIN Practices 
B. USE OF TRADITIONALLY TRAINED ROMO FORCES 
1. Algeria: French Airborne 
The French paratroopers failed as an organization to rectify the insurgent 
struggle in Algeria; though they enjoyed limited tactical success, the whole of the 
French effort could not surpass the early stages of repression and violence.  The 
French military, though having colonial and constabulary experience, was 
organized in the post-WWII era to fight a high intensity conflict on the plains of 
Europe as an element of NATO.  France ultimately lost the war, and Algeria was 
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formally recognized in 1963 as an independent nation.  The region has been a 
hotbed of Islamic instability ever since, but that is a topic for an ancillary study. 
In assessing the force relative to the RAND metrics, the paratroopers were 
evenly balanced in “yes” or “no” answers for execution of the “Good” COIN 
practices.  They were unable to maintain an operational mission set that 
inculcated the “Good” COIN practices into their force, and failed to control the 
tangible support of the insurgents, save for in isolated tactical settings, such as 
the Battle of Algiers.  While the paratroopers were largely regular Army 
professionals, the vast majority of the French military involved in Algeria were 
conscripts from metropolitan France, Foreign Legion, or Muslim Battalions raised 
from the occupied territories in Algeria.  The discipline and esprit de corps of the 
regular paratroopers was lacking, as indicated by excesses of violence, looting, 
and desertion. 
A revealing view of the French airborne is afforded by their recorded 
execution of “Bad” COIN practices, in which they accrued 10 “Yes” and three 
“No” answers.  While the “Good” and “Bad” practices are not perfectly diametric, 
a positive answer to one side of the chart generally equates to a negative answer 
on the other side of the chart.  Most significant to the study is the mixed answer 
relative to the populations perceptions of the COIN force, compared to the 
insurgent.  Within Algeria, and over the course of the conflict, the FLN and ALN 
conducted nearly as much collateral damage and atrocity against the population, 
as the French did in collective punishment and repression.  As the war dragged 
on, discipline within the COIN force writ large waned, and revenge killings 
against the Muslim population began to increase among the conscripts, further 
reducing all French forces from maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the 
populace, and the world. 
The insurgent organizations, operating both in Algeria and metropolitan 
France, were able to leverage battlefield events into information operations, and 
thusly, into political action.  Six French Prime Ministers fell to the wavering of 
public support for the war, and the entirety of the Fourth Republic Government 
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fell, as a related result of national war fatigue.  This weariness was also 
compounded by the recent defeat in French Indochina, and had profound effects 
upon mid-to-senior grade soldiers that left one war, and reported directly into 
another.  While the French military was tactically and operationally successful in 
Algeria, highlighted in the 10th Airborne’s victory in the Battle of Algiers, political 
pressure forced Charles De Gaulle and the Fifth Republic to capitulate and 
withdraw military forces from Algeria. 
2.   Afghanistan: Soviet Army 
The Soviet military failed as a COIN force in Afghanistan; the research 
shows their failure was nearly the archetype of COIN failure, as they 
accomplished every “Bad” COIN practice described in the RAND study.  While 
there was a level of theater specific learning, and attempts to conduct several of 
the “Good” COIN practices, early prolific use of violence against the civilian 
populace roused the religious fervor of the Pashtun tribal majorities.  The Soviets 
departed their client state in defeat in February 1989, and subsequently fell into 
their own dissolution as a nation-state on 31 December 1991. 
The Soviets attempted to adapt to the environment mid-course, and 
conducted several attempts at strategic communications with the rural populace, 
education programs, and economic development.  The Soviets also began using 
smaller scale units, less firepower, and more intelligence driven operations; this 
is a positive step, opposite of the massive, multi-battalion sweep and clear 
operations conducted early in the war.  From these subsequent attempts, I have 
drawn the four “Yes” answers for “Good” COIN practices.  Though the COIN 
efforts were made, they were not grounded with equally viable messages 
espousing the quality and legitimacy of the Afghan government.  Labeled as 
apostate by the pious rural Muslims, the Afghan government lost the historical 
protection it had from the Pashtun tribesmen, and soon only controlled the 
progressive urban areas with the support of the Soviets. 
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The Soviet Army in Afghanistan initially intended to bolster the Afghan 
government and military against the Mujahedeen through sudden decisive 
victories using high-technology weapons systems, armored vehicles, and 
aviation dominance.  In a Maoist fashion, however, the insurgents maintained 
refuge among the populace in the rural areas of the country; in attempting to 
deny the “fish” of the “water,” the Soviet 40th Army began a massive pacification 
effort that could only be described as a “depopulation” campaign.  The Soviet 
Army was too small and too diffused about the population centers in order to take 
the fight, lethal or otherwise, to the enemy in the rural areas.  The Soviets thusly 
were never able to deny the insurgents the tangible support of the population, 
and the mujahedeen were able to grow large enough to mass against small 
elements of the Soviet and Afghan Army, and destroy them piecemeal.  This 
technique became decisive as the insurgents received foreign assistance in the 
mid-1980s; principle to isolating the Soviets were the threat posed by American 
Stinger and British Blowpipe anti-aircraft missiles. 
The Soviet conscript formations suffered discipline issues, which 
subsequently manifested in casual atrocities against rural and urban Muslims, 
theft and robbery, and desertion.  Discipline may have also contributed to the 
astoundingly high rates of non-battle injuries, which were predominantly diseases 
preventable by common field sanitation techniques.  Soviet commanders in 
Afghanistan attempted to increase professionalism and effectiveness of the 
forces in country, but COIN techniques, modified organizations, and operational 
flexibility and decentralization never made inroads within the larger Soviet 
military.  The Soviet Union created recruits and units to fight the ROMO theater-
level struggle against NATO or China; on regularly scheduled rotations, they 
arrived in Afghanistan requiring subsequent training.  The level of 
professionalism in the Soviet Army increased as the war neared its conclusion, 
which lends credence to the training received in-theater.   
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C. USE AND TRAINING OF GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES THAT 
ADAPTED EX POST 
1.   Vietnam: U.S.M.C CAP 
The United States involvement in Vietnam ultimately ended in defeat, 
resulting in the collapse of the South Vietnam government, conquest of the South 
by North Vietnam, and the subsequent consolidation of the two countries into one 
Communist nation.  The American military prosecuted the war in the manner that 
it wanted to fight, namely seeking large formations of uniformed enemy regular 
forces against whom to array overwhelming firepower in an attrition style of 
warfare.  Until GEN Creighton Abrams took command of MAC-V, the metrics of 
body count and ordinance expended were measures of success, and this mental 
model became inculcated into the Army’s culture.  As Abrams attempted to 
strategically change the direction of the war, he encountered overwhelming 
organizational inertia; the Army resisted change, the institutional pressures were 
at too high a level to instill adaptation and flexibility.  Similar to the French and 
Soviet models, the war was a tactical success, but lost on the political side; this 
demonstrates the adversarial nature of time, relative to when an expeditionary 
force from a democracy conducts a counterinsurgent campaign.  American 
forces began withdrawing from South Vietnam in 1969, with all military 
formations gone from the country in 1973. 
The Marine CAP platoons evolved from the U.S.M.C organizational history 
of small wars, a role in which from their inception was the Marines niche within 
the nation’s defense policies.  Massed operations such those in WWII and Korea 
were an abnormality for the Marines, a small element that had an organizational 
culture and affinity for “relational-maneuver” warfare, as described by Edward 
Luttwak.  The CAP platoons tallied 11 “yes” answers for the “Good” COIN 
practice, and two “yes” answers for “Bad” COIN practices.  Key “Yes” answers 
include control of the insurgents tangible support sources, perceptions of 
legitimacy of the COIN force, and perceptions of security offered by the COIN 
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force.  Fifteen Marines, specially selected and amiable to the Asiatic population, 
when coupled with 30 Popular Forces, were more than adequate to defend an 
area of 5 square miles and 5,000 civilian population.  The Marines lived in the 
town with the populace, and drew a sizable portion of their material sustenance 
from the village.  They were tactical patrolling masters, preferring to conduct 
night patrols and ambushes with small arms and grenades; not relying on heavy 
artillery, the Marines were surgically judicious with force, which maintained the 
support and respect of the villagers.   
Examining a small organization in a small sector with metrics that examine 
operational-level characteristics is difficult; I assessed a number of 
characteristics, both “Good” and “Bad”, as Not Applicable.  Without the financial 
wherewithal of a modern CERP program, the CAP could not develop local 
businesses or infrastructure through financial means.  They did, however, secure 
the area from VC tax collectors, which enabled more agrarian revenue to stay 
within the local economy.  The COIN force did not create new grievances against 
the governance, but the Revolutionary Development forces, as agents of the 
Saigon government, created issues within the CAP zone; this was indicative of 
the polarity between the rural populace base, and the urban ruling elites.  The 
metrics of success are clear; in the Bihn Nghia village example, the Marines 
departed the area in late 1967, and the PF militia had been professionalized to 
the point of attaining tactical superiority over the Vietcong.  The area remained 
pacified until the NVA traversed it on their final push into Saigon in 1975.  
The difficulty in replicating the Marine’s success lies in the organizational 
cost it took to create the CAP platoons.  The first platoon was specially selected 
from light infantrymen from the entirety of an 800 man conventional battalion; as 
the program continued, I Corps established a mission specific in-theater training 
mechanisms, and codified selection criteria.  The friction lies within the 
requirements of only the best Marines; no subordinate commander wants to lose 
a good person to something that is outside of the larger mission set of the parent 
unit.  The Marine’s personnel limitation was not increased to compensate for the 
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CAP program, creating a zero-sum game of manpower between the conventional 
ROMO formations, and the COIN CAP organizations.  As with any small group of 
isolated soldiers, the Marines ran tremendous risks in the early stages of their 
operations, before they strengthened their relationship with the villagers, and 
truthful information began to flow about enemy composition, disposition, and 
strength.  A further friction exists when considering instituting this model, 
especially when dealing with the contemporary, professional military: if the larger 
institution does not recognize the special assignment, individuals may find 
themselves in threat of career advancement, or decreased opportunities for 
subsequent positions of increased responsibility.   
D.   CREATION AND TRAINING OF SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCES EX 
ANTE 
1.   Philippines: Philippine Army Battalion Combat Teams 
The Philippines and the Hukbalahap (Huk) Rebellion of the early 1950s 
was a proto-western democracy versus a Maoist communist insurgency, and 
represents a level of success as both a former American protectorate, and in the 
dramatic reorganization and preparation of troops prior to engaging in the 
contested areas.129  I chose not to include this case study as my focus was on 
expeditionary COIN forces, their training, and their effectiveness.  The Philippine 
experience contains a number of interesting observations that are germane to 
the larger discussion, especially as we consider the institutional inflexibility and 
lack of organizational agility and evolution among the three superpowers 
described earlier.   Among these are restructuring the military to emphasize 
population outreach and civil action, decentralizing control and authority, and the 
willingness of the Philippine government to restructure and reorganize the  
 
 
                                            
129 Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths, 52–54. 
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military in order to win the war they were involved in.  These observations are not 
polar opposites of the case studies, but are significantly different enough to 
warrant comment, and further study. 
Then-Philippine Secretary of Defense Ramón Magsaysay identified one of 
the grievances that the Huk rebellion had was with the Philippine Armed Forces 
(PAF); their actions sent strategic communications to the populace, and the 
message was that the Quirino administration held the population in derision.  The 
population needed to trust the PAF, because the military would be the executors 
of the central government’s policies.  The PAF initially was modeled after 
American Army formations, and had many veterans of WWII among its officers 
and NCOs.  The PAF routinely conducted intimidation and extortion operations 
against the rural population, and had a level of corruptness and incompetence 
that was unacceptable.130   
Magsaysay boldly attacked the incompetence and corruption through 
“summery discharges, court-martials of the guilty and field promotions of the 
deserving.”131  Working with the American Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group 
(JUSMAG), Magsaysay was able to increase rations and pay for the soldiers, 
ending habits of foraging and commandeering resources from the host populace; 
this incremental step greatly improved soldier morale.132  President Quirino 
instituted wide changes in the operational structure of the war, sectoring the 
contested zone into four Military Area Commands, and assigning to each area an 
Army Battalion Combat Team (BCT).  The BCTs, commanded by young officers 
between the ages of 25 and 33, were modeled loosely on an American light 
infantry battalion, but intended to be agile and flexible, and to maintain a high 
operational tempo of both lethal and non-lethal activities.  They were designed to 
                                            
130 Lawrence M. Greenburg, The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful 
Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955  (Washington: U.S. Army Center of 
Military History, 1987) http://www.history.army.mil/books/coldwar/huk/huk-fm.htm (accessed 30 
September 2010), 82–83. 
131 Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths, 54. 
132 Lawrence M. Greenburg, The Hukbalahap Insurrection, 100. 
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be employed in small unit operations, focusing on the squad and platoon levels 
of organization as the decisive echelon, versus the emphasis that battalions and 
brigades were given by the Fort Leavenworth Command and General Staff 
College.133 
As the BCTs prosecuted the kinetic fight against the Huks, reorganized 
and more representative of the central governments values, the central 
government pursued other key grievances that lent weight to the Huk rebellion.  
The government executed population relocation, but combined it with a positive 
information campaign that preempted counter-propaganda by the Huks; 
Magsaysay and JUSMAG went as far as to recruit former Huks to populate 
relocation camps, and used radio and television to broadcast their stories to their 
former comrades.  The population resettlement/relocation program was 
combined, publically, with land reform acts, addressing yet another root cause of 
instability.134   
The BCTs conducted COIN operations integral to the furtherance of 
governmental policies.  In addition to civic action and policing tasks, the military 
had reacquired the populace’s trust to a degree that they were used to secure 
national level elections, creating a “honest and tranquil election even by 
American standards, and an erosion in the strength of the incumbent Liberal 
Party”.  The PAF used Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets to assist in 
securing the polling stations, which had the effect of further inculcating the 
national values into the next generation of military leaders.135 
The Philippine government successfully nested a number of 
complementary, asymmetric, and concurrent efforts to address the Huk rebellion.  
In order to more efficiently execute the kinetic aspects of the campaign, the PAF 
                                            
133 Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths, 54–55, 57; Lawrence M. Greenburg, The Hukbalahap 
Insurrection, 86–87. 
134 Lawrence M. Greenburg, The Hukbalahap Insurrection, 88–90. 
135 Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths, 61; Lansdale, Edward G.  In the Midst of Wars: An 
American’s Mission to Southeast Asia (New York: Fordham University Press, 1991), 88–92. 
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formed hybrid BCTs, manned by specially selected leaders, and stringently 
cleansed of corrupt and incompetent members.  Addressing a salient issue of the 
Huks, the Philippine government underwent bold restructuring of land ownership 
policies, and placed a heavy emphasis on communicating the changes to the 
populace in and around the contested zone.  Lastly, by instilling the values 
system of the nation into the military, the PAF was entrusted to secure the most 
sovereign of events during an insurgency, a national vote.  A metric of the honest 
conduct of the vote is indicated by the decrease in strength of the incumbent 
party.  
E. THE WAY AHEAD 
Magsaysay’s wholesale reorganization of his nation’s armed forces stands 
in direct contravention to Gian Gentile’s contemporary views on the United States 
armed forces.  Gentile argues that, while nation building (Iraq and Afghanistan) 
have become the mission set of the modern U.S. Army, the skills required to 
execute high-intensity warfare have atrophied, and placed America’s strategic 
defense and force projection capabilities at risk.  As soon as possible, the nation 
and military must return to preparing for the next high intensity fight, because the 
military that has developed over the last decade is not capable of executing 
those mission sets.136 
As this study has highlighted, successful prosecution of a COIN struggle 
may not rest in the hands of some theoretical hybrid force of standing cultural 
warriors, regionally affiliated, linguistically capable, and predisposed to 
constabulary and civic action mission sets, as Edward Luttwak would advocate.  
Through the failure of the Soviet, French, and American ROMO formations 
during their respective trials, this study does demonstrate that COIN is not a 
lesser-included offense of the wider Range of Military Operations; if that was the 
                                            
136 Gian P. Gentile, “Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars,” Joint Forces Quarterly 52, 1st 
Quarter (2009), 27–33, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Let's+build+an+army+to+win+all+wars.-
a0193510865 (accessed 13 October 2010), 27. 
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case, the aforementioned conventional forces would have had higher success 
rates, and scored higher on the RAND “Good and Bad” practices scale. 
This study draws a correlation between training for COIN, and 
effectiveness at COIN; it also illustrates a level of the positive effects of selectivity 
in personnel staffing.  Each of the ROMO forces had small groups and key 
leaders within the larger service that demonstrated levels of flexibility and 
adaptive learning, and subsequently attempted to institutionalize some of that 
knowledge though in-theater schools.  This study alludes to contemporary 
debates currently conducted at the highest echelons of national security.  One 
side advocates maintaining the preponderance of our military power oriented on 
strategic deterrence, and attaining decisive victory over a peer or near-peer 
competitor.  The other side accepts the likelihood of small-scale conflicts with 
non-state actors, or rogue elements originating from failed states, and seeks to 
institutionalize the lessons learned from the contemporary conflicts.  Paul Grant 
highlights a number of the contemporary training tasks and regimens that 
conventional U.S. Army Soldiers experience prior to deployment; a potential topic 
for further research would apply the RAND metrics to a contemporary Army 
formation in Afghanistan or Iraq, and then correlate that data set to the training 
models that Grant discusses to determine corollary effects.  The findings from 
this subsequent study could form further impetus to institutionalize the lessons 
learned in the GWOT, and continue to grow and develop as a military with 
manifold capabilities within the complex geopolitical environment, rather than to 
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APPENDIX:  A WAY AHEAD FOR RSTA SQUADRONS EX POST 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The War in Afghanistan will continue for a number of years; this is a 
political concern, but the military stands in support of the civilian leadership, and 
must accomplish the missions issued to it.  The U.S. Army ROMO forces have 
done an excellent job in adopting and evolving to the COIN environment in 
Afghanistan with the assets made available to it.  Without going through the 
complete DOTMLPF analysis within the Army Acquisitions methodology, the 
following is a tactical leader’s perspective of a way to improve the operational 
capabilities of an existing organization – the Light Reconnaissance, Surveillance, 
Target Acquisition (RSTA) Cavalry Squadron.   
 As cited from the Defense Acquisitions University Glossary of Defense 
Acquisition Acronyms and Terms, DOTMLPF is:  
…the first substep in the Functional Solution Analysis (FSA). It 
determines whether an integrated Doctrine, Organization, Training, 
Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, and Facilities 
(DOTMLPF) approach (that is, a non-materiel approach) or a 
materiel approach is required to fill the capability gaps identified in 
the Functional Need Analysis (FNA).  Capability proposals may 
involve a mix of both DOTMLPF and materiel changes. 
- Doctrine: the way we fight, e.g., emphasizing maneuver warfare 
combined air-ground campaigns  
- Organization: how we organize to fight; divisions, air wings, 
Marine-Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), etc.  
- Training: how we prepare to fight tactically; basic training to 
advanced individual training, various types of unit training, joint 
exercises, etc.  
- Materiel: all the “stuff” necessary to equip our forces, that is, 
weapons, spares, etc. so they can do operate effectively  
- Leadership and education: how we prepare our leaders to lead 
the fight from squad leader to 4-star general/admiral; professional 
development  
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- Personnel: availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, 
and various contingency operations  
- Facilities: real property; installations and industrial facilities (e.g., 
government owned ammunition production facilities) that support 
our forces137 
 
 Without a formal MTOE change, an Army BCT Commander could institute 
the following changes to a RSTA formation by reallocating resources from within 
the BCT organization, and placing command emphasis upon revised motorized 
element training standards.  Decisions of this nature are similar to that faced by 
the Marine battalion commanders relative to the CAP platoons in Vietnam; to 
enable success in one area, a commander may have to accept risk in another. 
 There are two capability shortcomings that the 1-61 Cavalry Squadron had 
to develop and resource during the foreshortened 12-month tour that could be 
reviewed through an organizational capacity microscope, insofar as they were 
requirements that were not officially sanctioned by the existing Reconnaissance, 
Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Modified Table of Organization 
(MTOE) or Mission Essential Task List (METL).  The first is the actual size of the 
Squadron; doctrinally, the Squadron has approximately 500 soldiers, and is 
divided into three combat Troops, one Combat Support Troop, and one 
Headquarters Troop.    
For the variety of missions that RSTA Squadrons are used to support the 
Global War on Terror, this troop strength is not enough.  Boring slightly into that 
detail is the second shortcoming, which is the dismounted nature of the Charlie 
Troop organization.  Charlie Troop is approximately the size of a traditional light 
infantry company (110 Soldiers), minus one 33-man platoon.  This Cavalry Troop  
 
 
in the modern RSTA concept is designed to be employed in a dismounted 
                                            
137 Defense Acquisition University, “DOTMLPF Analysis,”  ACQuipedia: Your Online 
Acquisition Library, https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=28870&view=w (accessed 30 
November 2010). 
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function in a traditional ROMO environment; for the GWOT in Afghanistan, this is 
an undesirable condition.138   
In order to highlight the key points of the capability gap, we will define the 
RSTA conceptually from what is designed to do, both regarding men and 
material, and I will briefly remark upon a few scenarios from OEF Rotation 08-09 
that highlight the deltas in these capabilities.  To successfully execute the GWOT 
in the capacity that combatant commanders are using them, Light, Airborne and 
Air Assault RSTA Squadrons need to increase in size by a maneuver Troop, all 
Troops need to be MTOE as mounted assets, and Squadron Command and 
Control node needs additional personnel above those authorized.   
B. COMBAT POWER INCREASE.   
 The astute reader will note that the platoon math does not add up; eight 
combat platoons organic, but nine committed to the fight in some manner.  C/1-
61 organically had 30-33-man dismounted platoons, while the Alpha and Bravo 
mounted platoons were typically 16-20 man in strength.  1-61 CAV leadership 
knew this difference would exist about one month before the deployment and, 
using a capable young officer in the operations staff, and a senior E6 squad 
leader, made the difficult decision and sub-divided C/1-61 into three mounted 
platoons; one of the A/1-61 platoons was actually 2/C/1-61, in its recombined, 
smaller state.  For the remainder of the discussion, consider an average Cavalry 
platoon to comprise four vehicles and 16 Troopers.  
 One crucial aspect was the fact that, despite two recent JRTC Rotations 
emphasizing the Troop and Platoon echelons of training, these three platoons 
had never trained in this manner of organization, nor had the Troop commanders 
trained in this fashion.  Force projection quickly became an issue during the 
rotation.  The general overhead to conduct force protection on a FOB is generally 
proportional to its size; the large Squadron FOB at Gardez required a platoon 
                                            
138 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-20.96 (Reconnaissance and Cavalry 
Squadron), 7-6–7-8.  Chapter 7 of FM 3-20.96 focuses on Stability Operations, and largely 
quantifies the mission set and capabilities of a Cavalry Squadron in a low-intensity environment. 
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plus to conduct FORCEPRO, while the smaller Troop level FOBs at Wilderness, 
Jaji, and Zormat had section (two vehicles, 8-10 men) or higher requirements.  
The friction comes when the only available combat power at a FOB or COP 
(combat outpost, the smaller, Troop-level FOBs) is that combat power that is 
either up in the guard towers, or is scheduled to go up in the towers six hours 
from hence.   
 Though pushing combat power out into the Area of Responsibility (AOR), 
and getting them closer to the effected population, is a critical nature of the COIN 
fight, the overhead that comes from a material and force protection standpoint is 
nearly insurmountable unless further troop strength is available to the AOR 
Commander.  As an operation wears on and time passes, the fatigue sets into 
the soldiers who go out on patrol every day for months, and pull a three-to-six- 
hour guard tour of duty every night; there is no rotation off the line, or ever the 
potential for rotation.  Truly imbedding into the effected populace for an extended 
duration of time is nearly impossible, because that combat platoon has duties 
during the night at the FOB or COP.   
 As a result of reinvigorated efforts on the Khost-Gardez Road Project, and 
a geometric increase in activity of the Haqqani Network of Al Qaeda, the summer 
of 2008 saw 1-61 Cavalry in Paktya transition from a BCT economy of force 
operation, to the kinetically intense Battle for the K-G Pass.  From JUN-AUG 08, 
1-61 CAV, re-tasked as the Divisional Decisive Operation but not “re-resourced” 
as such, had to accept extreme operational risk in Zormat and Jaji, and pulled 
two of the three available platoons from those commanders into the Zadran Arc 
districts.139  The enemy forces in the Zormat region quickly realized that the ISAF 
presence in the region had nearly vanished, and attacks against governance 
buildings and persons, infrastructure, and the COP increased dramatically.  A 
similar situation, to a lesser extent, happened vicinity Jaji and the Border Control 
Points vicinity Pakistan.  Following the Battle of the K-G Pass, 4/101 BCT 
returned the B/1-61 unit to Paktya, necessitating the construction of yet another 
                                            
139 TF Currahee, Afghan Commander AAR Book, 27-–28. 
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COP in the KG Pass; this transition did not occur and B/1-61 did not begin 
executing operations until the last weeks of November 2008: too little, too late.140 
 The preponderance of forces that the American military will detail to the 
Afghanistan campaign will be, for the foreseeable future, light in orientation (not 
Mechanized or Classical Armor Heavy).  Light, Airborne and Air Assault RSTA 
Squadrons will continue to be employed as “property owners,” vice the traditional 
reconnaissance and screening missions they are designed, trained, manned and 
equipped to execute.  The Department of the Army needs to conduct a MTOE 
review in a hasty manner and authorize a fourth maneuver Troop to each 
Squadron organization; Cavalry squadrons, at 500 or less men, have for at least 
three consecutive years between 2006 and 2009, been assigned to execute the 
exact same task that Infantry battalions, at 900-1000 men, are expected to 
execute.  Clever, innovative leadership, mental flexibility, reliance on technology, 
and development and use of host nation security forces have granted limited 
success to these Cavalry organizations with their Spartan manning; it is only a 
matter of time before something more dramatic happens due to lack of strength.  
C. COMPLETE MOUNTED CAPACITY.   
 As noted above, the Charlie Troop organization in a Cavalry Squadron is 
designed to be a dismounted asset, with a minimal vehicular trace.141  The two 
platoons of a Charlie Troop are 30-33 men, organized into three maneuver 
squads and an austere platoon headquarters.  The troop headquarters has two 
man-portable 60mm mortar systems, and administratively control the Squadron 
asset of two sniper teams.  This is an outstanding organization for an 
environment that is linear in nature, closer in a spatial sense, and more densely 
vegetated; it would even work well in a dense, urban environment.  In the perfect 
storm that is Afghanistan, a dismounted element is less than ideal.  The amount 
                                            
140 U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD News Briefing with Colonel John P. Johnson,” 3–4.  
COL Johnson emphasizes the Khost-Gardez Road, and the importance for the economic 
development for the AOR.   
141 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-20.96 (Reconnaissance and Cavalry 
Squadron), 1-8–1-9. 
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of space and population that an organization needs to service is far greater than 
the organization is designed to execute, and necessitates rapid tactical mobility.   
 Though the 4/101 BCT and 1/61 CAV may have been 80% or higher 
qualified as Air Assault soldiers, and C/1-61 CAV had a disproportionately high 
amount of Air Assault, Ranger and Pathfinder qualified Troopers, the limitation in 
conducting vertical envelopment came from the rotary wing air frame availability 
and the terrain constrictions afforded in the KG Pass AOR.  Approval for a non-
standard Helicopter Landing Zone was a tiresome, bureaucratic process with 
nearly a 96-hour lag time between approval at Squadron level, and approval at 
Division level (the echelon that controlled both the airframes and the operational 
approval).  At the tactical level, in order to react to the requirements of the 
effected populace and the actions of a freethinking enemy force, Troop 
commanders required tactical mobility that was available 24-7, and on a 
moment’s notice.   
 The weather in Paktya, relative to the various bases where the airframes 
were based, served to further limit the ability of rotary wing to be responsive to 
the maneuver commander; conventional army helicopters are limited to 1000 feet 
ceilings and three nautical miles of visibility, compounded by the requirements for 
at least 35% illumination (ambient) during periods of limited visibility.  Special 
Operations airframes, as well as Air Force HH-60 Combat, Search and Rescue 
(CSAR) aircraft have increased tolerances due to technology and 
training/certification, but were sporadically available to service a conventional 
Cavalry unit.   
 Finally, Paktya is isolated due to geography; the Seti Kandow pass, linking 
the Khost Bowl (where the 4/101 BCT and the preponderance of the General 
Purpose Forces airframes were stationed) and the Zormat Valley (that contains 
Gardez city and the immediate environs), is one of the few gateways for air  
 
 
transit, and is at an elevation of 12,000 feet.  Operations at this elevation are 
 79
limited by both a decreased Aircraft Load, and a reduced capacity to successfully 
hover or land.   
 The actual Area of Operations that the Squadron assigned to C/1-61 was 
far more compressed than that assigned to the other maneuver troops in Zormat 
and Jaji Ayrub, but there was still a substantial amount of distance that the 
Troopers of Charlie had to cover on a routine basis.  The terrain was also far 
more vertically differentiated that the flat plains of the other two AOs; COP 
Wilderness sat at 5,000 feet elevation, and some of the patrol routes, villages 
and key terrain objectives were at 9,500 feet or higher.  Soldiers load was 
tremendous; 50 pounds of body armor and protective equipment, plus 30 to 50 
more pounds of weapons, ammunition, and water.142  To operate in this 
environment with any expectations of success, C/1-61 needed to be mounted, 
either in Uparmored High Mobility Multi-wheeled Vehicles (UAH), or Mine-
resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAP).   
 The friction arises in the MTOE of the organization, which drives the METL 
under which they are equipped and trained.  Like the manner in which the 
structure and size of the Squadron limits the manner in which it can be 
employed, coding within the MTOE of the Charlie Troop as a dismounted force 
limits the amount of institutional training on vehicular operations that the unit can 
conduct at home station.  The training funds, the time, and the training platforms 
were not available to C/1-61 during the train up, despite the fact that the 
Squadron and BCT both knew that there was a pre-positioned fleet of vehicles 
for all the troops when they arrived in country.  The organizational training 
mechanisms within the bureaucratic process forced C/1-61 to train along its 
METL task list; conduct dismounted area and point reconnaissance, conduct 
counter-sniper operations, and enter building/clear room, and a further hybrid of 
collective tasks that combines a series of Long Range Surveillance Detachment 
and standard Light Infantry METLs.   
                                            
142 TF Currahee, Afghan Commander AAR Book, 37. 
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 The lack of training on vehicles, and the commiserate lack of a vehicular 
culture, caused a number of organizational and incidental frictions that could 
have been mitigated.  Licensed, though inexperienced, drivers routinely rolled 
vehicles on the rough terrain, or managed to mechanically disable them by 
attempting maneuvers that more seasoned crewmen and leaders would not have 
attempted.  Leaders did not enforce vehicle load plans stringently; those leaders 
had never been strictly inculcated into a mounted mentality.  On the constrictive 
roads of the K-G Pass, gunners occasionally impacted passing traffic with the 
barrels of their heavy crew-served weapons, generating both injuries to the 
gunners, and damage to the host nation vehicles, further widening the gulf 
between the populace and the ISAF force.  Similarly, gunners and vehicle 
commanders had difficulty both identifying targets, and engaging them as a crew.  
 This skill set, commonly developed over the career of a 19D Cavalry 
Scout, was further compounded by the severe vertical nature of the terrain.  A 
modern UAH or MRAP has an intensely sophisticated Command and Control 
suite in each vehicle, and it requires an equally sophisticated maintenance 
schedule.  Due both to the high operational tempo, and the lack of a motorized 
culture, disciplined and routine maintenance of the vehicles was not 
accomplished by the Troopers of C/1-61, and often manifested in non-mission-
capable vehicles, or communications that failed during a mission.143   
 Changing the MTOE of the Charlie Troop organization from a dismounted 
capacity to a mounted capacity will directly impact the home-station training 
priorities, changing the organizational culture and creating a more efficient, 
effective unit that will thrive in an Afghanistan environment. 
D. CONCLUSION 
 The GWOT will continue into the near future, and COCOMs will continue 
to assign RSTA Squadrons in property-owning, non-reconnaissance-oriented 
operational mission sets.  Changing the MTOE of a Light, Air Assault or Airborne 
                                            
143 TF Currahee, Afghan Commander AAR Book, 37–38.  
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RSTA Squadron is critical to ensuring the ability of these RSTA Squadrons to 
accomplish any mission that they are given within the CENTCOM AOR.  These 
changes should principally rotate around expanding the strength of the whole 
squadron by one Cavalry Troop of 19D Cavalry Scouts, and by reorganizing the 
Charlie Troop organization from a dismounted to a mounted asset for the 
maneuver commander.  A 600-man enhanced Light Cavalry Squadron would not 
empirically equal an 800-1000 man light infantry battalion; however, the mental 
flexibility, initiative, imagination, and motivation of Cavalry Troopers and leaders 
would shortly overcome the deficit, and capitalize upon the investment of 
additional Troopers and vehicles.  
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